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The period under review is marked by significant events in the development of conflict of laws.' The 1967 Florida Legislature enacted a
rather disappointing revision of jurisdictional statutes,2 and the Supreme
Court of Florida through the certification procedure, almost joined the
Kilberg reformist movement.3 On the national scene an enlivened discus* Professor of Law, University of Miami.
1. This survey should be read in conjunction with the two surveys previously published
in 18 U. MIAMI L. REV. 269 (1963) and in 20 U. MIAMI L. REV. 495 (1966) [hereinafter
referred to as Survey I and Survey II].
Editorial help by Mrs. Sara Laxson Smith, senior law student at the University of
Miami, is gratefully acknowledged.
2. Fla. Laws 1967, ch. 67-254.
3. See note 186 infra.
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sion4 continues on some of the doctrinal principles and there has been a
lining-up of jurisdictions along the Kilberg-Babcock schism.
I.

GENERAL PROBLEMS

A number of cases reported recently revolved around statutes of
limitations. The Florida statute (including the borrowing aspect as well as
the tolling provisions) was at issue in Aviation Credit Corporation v.
Batchellor.5 In an action brought in Florida upon a promissory note the
defendant pleaded the California statute of limitations, on the ground that
the note was executed in California, the defendant's domicile. Reversing
the lower court's decision for defendant, the appellate court held that regardless of the defendant's domicile, the cause of action arose in Florida
where the note was payable on the ground that:
[T]he accrual of a cause of action does not depend upon the
coincident existence of all those factors which are necessary to
transform the cause of action into a judgment. The law provides
a remedy for wrongs, i.e., a right of action upon a cause of action. If the plaintiff seeks a judgment in personam in most cases,
our laws require personal service of process upon the defendant.
Therefore, the unavailability of the defendant in a given state
may have an effect upon the availability of an immediate remedy
in that state, but this does not mean that no cause of action
accrued in that state.6
The court concluded that Florida's borrowing statute, which is limited to
causes of action that have "arisen in another state . . . of the United

States," was inapplicable. The defendant also argued that he could not
have "returned to Florida" as required by the tolling provision since he
had never been in Florida before. This argument was dismissed on the
ground that such a literal interpretation of the statute had been rejected
in prior Florida Supreme Court decisions.
The crucial questions of when and where the cause of action arose
under the Pennsylvania borrowing statute were before a federal forum sitting in Pennsylvania in Mack Truck, Inc. v. Bendix-Westinghouse Auto,
A.B. Co.7 The plaintiff bought brake assemblies manufactured by a third
party from the defendant to be used in vehicles assembled by the plaintiff.
A Florida resident purchased a truck from the plaintiff, and while operating it in Florida was involved in an accident because of defective brakes.
A judgment was obtained against the plaintiff by a party injured in the
4. For a lucid insight, see Ehrenzweig, A Counter-Revolution in Conflicts Law? From
Beale to Cavers, 80 HARV. L. REV. 377 (1966). For a discussion of general problems, see

Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U. L. REv. 267 (1966),
and Conflicts Law: More on Choice-Influencing Considerations, 54 CAL. L. REV. 1584
(1966).
5. 190 So.2d 8 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
6. Id. at 11.
7. 372 F.2d 18 (3d Cir. 1966).
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accident. More than three years after the plaintiff satisfied the judgment
the present action was instituted in a federal district court in Pennsylvania against the manufacturer for indemnity in the amount of the judgment. The defendant raised the statute of limitations and the court
applied the conflict rules of Pennsylvania, including the borrowing statute
which referred to the "state . . . in which the [cause of action] arose."
While recognizing that the Pennsylvania borrowing statute utilizes the
"concept of the arising of a cause of action in relation to the place rather
than to time," the court nevertheless held that the "cause of action arises
where, as well as when the final significant event that is essential to a
suable claim occurs," and concluded that the cause of action arose when
the judgment was entered against and satisfied by the plaintiff, adding
that "by the same token, Florida is the state where the cause of action for
indemnity arose."8 Since the three year Florida statute of limitations had
run, the court, despite a strong dissent, affirmed the lower court's dismissal of the case.
Florida's statute of limitations was indirectly involved in an action
brought in Puerto Rico by a plaintiff who was injured there while employed by a Florida corporation. In De Vane v. United States9 the one
year Puerto Rican statute of limitations had expired, but the plaintiff
urged the application of the Florida four year statute of limitations
alleging that he was insured pursuant to Florida Workmen's Compensation Law, and that this state's limitations statute should therefore control.
The court, however, held that the conflict rule in force in Puerto Rico is
that of lex loci delicti, which, being also the lex Jori, makes the Puerto
Rican limitation provisions applicable regardless of the plaintiff's domicile
in Florida. Observing that "there is no rule of renvoi in tort actions
brought within this jurisdiction," the court indicated that even if the law
of Florida controlled, it "would still end up by applying the law of Puerto
Rico on the question of the statute of limitations"'" because of Florida's
borrowing statute. Finally the court dealt in general terms with two
propositions. First, assuming (erroneously) that if the action could not be
maintained in Florida because the "law applicable in the jurisdiction of
Florida would be the law from the jurisdiction where the cause of action
8. Id. at 20. Cf. Chartener v. Kice, 270 F. Supp. 432 (E.D.N.Y. 1967); Baron Tube Co.
v. Transport, Ins. Co., 365 F.2d 858 (5th Cir. 1966). The issue as to the time when the
action arose was involved in an action brought by a Florida corporation against its
attorneys for malpractice resulting in damages, i.e., impounding its boats fishing in Venezuelan
waters, Fort Myers Seafood Packers v. Steptoe and Johnson, 381 F.2d 261 (D.C. Cir. 1967),
rehearing denied. Note, The Commencement of the Statute of Limitations in Legal Malpractice Actions: the Need for Re-evaluation, Eckert v. Schaal, 15 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 230
(1967).
Federal law will determine the "date of accrual [of a federally created right] even
though the period of limitation thereafter is determined by state law," Azalea Meats, Inc. v.
Muscat, 386 F.2d 5 (5th Cir. 1967), rev'g 246 F. Supp. 780 (S.D. Fla. 1965).
9. 259 F. Supp. 18 (D.P.R. 1966).
10. Id. at 20.
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has arisen" (i.e., Puerto Rico), the Florida four year limitation "cannot
be applied in this case, where the action is brought in a court within the
jurisdiction of Puerto Rico." The court also commented that the possible
extraterritorial effect of the Florida statute of limitations had no bearing,
since Florida law "adopting and specifically making applicable the statute
of limitations from the jurisdiction where the cause of action arises," 11
would apply the one year statute of limitations of Puerto Rico.
Morals, taxes, and law converge in a cacophony of unsavory accommodations in cases dealing with gambling debts incurred in a jurisdiction
where a particular mode of gambling is legal, when enforcement is sought
in a jurisdiction which allows controlled gambling, but not the particular
mode in question. In Dorado Beach Hotel Corporationv. Jernigan,12 while
admitting that Florida condones certain specified forms of gambling,
staged for those "seeking pleasure in the State-primarily tourists," with
the state receiving its "cut of the take," the court nevertheless denied its
"judicial arm to the collection of monies wagered in such enterprises not
authorized by the law of the State of Florida." However, the public policy
argument used by the court deserves a more careful analysis. First of all,
the legality vel non of a foreign gambling debt is not directly controlled
by the lex jori since this law applies only to gambling activities in Florida,
and this law, as it is written, claims no extraterritorial effect. Only if
Florida's gambling statutes should provide the basis from which general
principles of public policy are to be gleaned may such principles apply to
the local enforcement of a foreign incurred gambling debt. In distilling
such public policy from Florida statutes it must be noted that both Florida and Puerto Rico have adopted, in regard to gambling, practically
identical policies by allowing limited, licensed, government-controlled
gambling, assuring, at the same time, the particular government a share in
the proceeds. However, it is difficult to see how differences in the modes of
gambling may overshadow the identical permissive policy in regard to
controlled gambling, strongly motivated, in both instances, by overriding
governmental fiscal interests. Thus it appears that both governments give
preference to their own fiscal interests over the dangers awaiting the tragic
gambler known from so many novels. But even in this respect Puerto Rico
has shown humanitarian concern for the victim of such nefarious activities
by providing for a reduction or even cancellation of gambling debts whenever they exceed what the statute terms "customs of a good father of
family," a compassion utterly foreign to Florida. Moreover even admitting for the sake of argument that gambling is against public policy and
only to be tolerated, it must be kept in mind that public policy intends to
11. Id. at 21.
.12. 202 So.2d 839 (Fla. Ist Dist. 1967) on the authority of Young v. Sands, Inc., 122
So.2d 618 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1960). But cf. International Hotels Corp. v. Golden, 15 N.Y.2d 9,
203 N.E.2d 210, 254 N.Y.S.2d 527 (1964), discussed in 11 N.Y.L. FORUM 548, 556 (1965).
Jurisdiction over a non-resident guest and gambler, San Juan Hotel Corp. v. Lefkowitz,
277 F. Supp. 28 (D.P.R. 1967).
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prevent foreign created claims from taking effect locally in a way which
would shock the moral fiber of the community. Applied to the present
situation, it is difficult to imagine that the mere payment of a check executed in Puerto Rico not showing its "immoral origin" could cause even
a ripple of revulsion wherever it may appear, e.g., in a local bank accepting payment. On the contrary, it could be a lesson to the gambler himself
as well as a deterrent to those who might otherwise succumb to such
temptation, an effect most desirable under the very public policy expounded by the court. Neither should the long-range results of the court's
interpretation be overlooked. There can be no doubt that the shield of
public policy extended to Floridians when gambling abroad will encourage
rather than discourage them in their foreign escapades since they will feel
safe both when pocketing winnings and also when owing for losses.
Finally, there is involved a simple question of basic propriety, namely
whether public policy should condone that an adult, apparently of some
means, who executed a valid check to pay for his pleasures at the licensed
gambling tables in another jurisdiction within the United States, may,
upon returning to his home in Florida take the moralistic attitude that
what he did was wrong and, consequently, renege on his otherwise valid
promise. Instead, the court took a rather grandiose stand of moral rectitude when proclaiming that "this forum will not extend its judicial arm to
aid in the collection of this type of gambling debt whether the transaction
giving rise to the loss arose in Nevada, Puerto Rico, or Monte Carlo."
II.

JURISDICTIONAL CONFLICTS

The concepts of jurisdiction and venue are often confused. As recently stated, 3 "venue is one thing; jurisdiction another. They are not
synonymous. Venue concerns 'the privilege of being accountable to a court
in a particular location.' Jurisdiction is 'the power to act,' the authority to
adjudicate the subject matter." The fundamental principles of judicial
jurisdiction have been succinctly restated in another case:' 4
Personal jurisdiction refers to the Court's ability to assert
judicial power over the parties and bind them by its adjudication. Service of process is the corollary requirement which sets
the Court's personal jurisdiction in gear. That is, someone
amenable to the assertion of jurisdiction cannot be subject to
its exercise until he has been properly served. Both that assertion of power and the subsequent service must be statutorily and constitutionally permissible. Due process requires certain ties or contacts between a foreign defendant and the forum
which asserts jurisdiction . . . and service reasonably calcu-

lated to notify him of the proceeding and afford him an opportunity to appear and be heard. 5
13. Williams v. Ferrentino, 199 So.2d 504 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967).
14. Japan Gas Lighter Ass'n v. Ronson Corp., 257 F. Supp. 219 (D.N.J. 1966).
15. Id. at 224.
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Acting Within Jurisdiction

The traditional rules for perfecting jurisdiction over the person of a
defendant require that he be served with process while present in the
state, that he be domiciled there, or that he consent to the jurisdiction.'"
These rules have been supplemented by a number of statutory methods of
imposing jurisdiction on an individual or on corporate defendants not
otherwise amenable to local jurisdiction. This is achieved by reliance, for
jurisdictional purposes, on past activities in the state, or present contacts
through agents, or offices or close connections with local business activities
through marketing set-ups. Florida has adopted these methods in its long7

arm statutes.1

At the risk of being repetitious,' 8 a proper method may be suggested
for dealing with long-arm statutes, based on the distinction between the
jurisdictional grant contained therein on the one hand, and the constitutional limitations imposed on such statutes under due process, on the
other. These two factors and their interrelations have been well presented
in a recent federal case: ' 9
One of the most elementary of legal principles is that a basis of
jurisdiction must exist before a court has competence to act.
Two tests are applied in determining whether a basis exists. The
first is the inquiry whether legislative jurisdiction exists: does
the state have the power to declare that its courts have jurisdiction over a particular subject matter? The second is whether
judicial jurisdiction exists, a determination made on the basis of
a twofold test: (1) assuming that legislative jurisdiction exists,
has the state exercised it by providing the courts with a method
of acquiring jurisdiction? (2) If a method has been so provided,
are there sufficient jurisdictional facts to satisfy the requirements of the method provided?2 °
In other words, is the jurisdictional grant as contained in the long-arm
statute within the legislative powers of the state as limited by the due
process clause? And if so, is the application of the statute within the scope
of proper statutory interpretation which may-in turn-take the position
that the jurisdictional grant is intended to expand the state's judicial
powers as far as constitutionally permissible? As a result, the jurisdictional grant may be found to coincide with the constitutional limitations
on state legislative powers, or it may be interpreted as intended not to
occupy the whole area available to state courts under the standards of due
process. 21
16. See Survey I, at 275, and Survey II, at 502.
17. See Survey I, at 278, and Survey II, at 503.
18. See Survey II, at 504.
19. Elliott v. Cabeen, 224 F. Supp. 50 (D. Colo. 1963).
20. Id. at 52. Cf. Waltham Precision Instrument Co. v. McDonnell Aircraft Corp., 310
F.2d 20 (Ist Cir. 1962), and Williams v. Connolly, 227 F. Supp. 539 (D. Minn. 1964).
21. Other jurisdictions are well aware of this alternative. In interpreting their long-
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Although the interrelationship between the statutory jurisdictional
grants and their constitutional validity has never been squarely faced by
the Florida courts, judicial opinions indicate that rather than applying a
narrow statutory interpretation, the courts will interpret the jurisdictional
grants under the long-arm statutes to reach the constitutional outer limits
and therefore to be co-extensive with the requirements of due process.22
Service of process on nonresidents is performed by substituted servarm statutes as co-extensive with the constitutional due process, these courts have abdicated
"their duty to construe 'the statutes of their own states and [then turn] it over to the
Supreme Court of the United States, which is the ultimate interpreter of the Constitution
of the United States" adding that "The attempt thus to expand jurisdiction is no new
phenomenon; it has just been more successful in recent years," Taylor v. Portland Paramount Corp., 383 F.2d 634, 640 (9th Cir. 1967). This position was taken in Alabama, New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 273 Ala. 656, 144 So.2d 25 (1962), rev'd on other grounds, 376
U.S. 254 (1964), motion for rehearing denied, 376 U.S. 967 (1964) ; Alaska, Northern Supply,
Inc. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 397 P.2d 1013 (Alaska 1965); California, Henry Jahn & Son,
Inc. v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. 2d 855, 323 P.2d 437, 439 (1958) ; Mechanical Contractors
Ass'n v. Mechanical Contractors Ass'n of N. Cal., 342 F.2d 393 (9th Cir. 1965) ; Illinois, Gray
v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961);
Gordon v. Infternational Tel. & Tel. Corp., 273 F. Supp. 164, 168 (N.D. Ill. 1967) ; Consolidated Laboratories v. Shandon Scientific Co., 384 F.2d 797 (7th Cir. 1967) ; -La.-,
Terasse v. Wisconsin Feeder Pig Mkt. Coop., - La. -, 202 So.2d 330 (Ct. App. 1967);
Bowlero, Inc. v. Allen, La. , 205 So.2d 196 (Ct. App. 1967); Maryland, Gkiafis v.
Steamship Yiosonas, 342 F.2d 546 (4th Cir. 1965) ; Beaty v. M.S. Steel Co., 276 F. Supp.
259 (D. Md. 1967) ; Minnesota, Washington Scientific Indus., Inc. v. Polan Indus., Inc., 273
F. Supp. 344, 346 (D. Minn. 1967); Montana, Bullard v. Rhodes Pharmacal Co., 263 F.
Supp. 79 (D. Mont. 1967); New Hampshire, Sanders Ass'n, Inc. v. Galion Iron Works &
Mfg. Co., 304 F.2d 915 (1st Cir. 1962); New Jersey, Jaffe v. Donal, 264 F. Supp. 845 (E.D.N.J. 1967) ; Ohio, Kahn v. Maico Co., 216 F.2d 233 (5th Cir. 1954) ; Seilon, Inc. v. Brema,
271 F. Supp. 516 (N.D. Ohio 1967); Oklahoma, B.K. Sweeney Co. v. Colorado Interstate
Gas Co., 429 P.2d 759 (Okla. 1967); South Carolina, Shealey v. Challenger Mfg. Co., 304
F.2d 102 (4th Cir. 1962) ; Ard v. State Stove Mfrs., Inc., 263 F. Supp. 699 (D.S.C. 1967) ;
American Iwer Corp. v. Rueland Elec. Co., 277 F. Supp. 375 (D.S.C. 1967) ; Tennessee,
Hamilton Nat'l Bank v. Russel, 261 F. Supp. 145 (E.D. Tenn. 1966); Texas, Turner v.
Jack Tar Grand Bahamas, Ltd., 353 F.2d 954 (5th Cir. 1965) ; Atwood Hatcheries v. Heisdorf & Nelson Farms, 357 F.2d 847 (5th Cir. 1966); Virginia, Moore-McCormack Lines,
Inc. v. Bunge Corp., 307 F.2d 910 (4th Cir. 1962) ; District of Columbia, Origoni v. Bulletin Co., 258 F. Supp. 359 (D.D.C. 1966), and Puerto Rico, Executive Air Servs., Inc. v.
Beech Aircraft Corp., 254 F. Supp. 415 (D.P.R. 1966) ; San Juan Hotel Corp. v. Lefkowitz,
277 F. Supp. 28 (D.P.R. 1967).
A narrower interpretation has been adopted, for example, in Arkansas, Davis v. Triumph Corp., 258 F. Supp. 418 (E.D. Ark. 1966); Massachusetts, Caso v. Lafayette Radio
Electronics Corp., 370 F.2d 707 (1st Cir. 1966) ; New York, Longines-Wittnauer Watch Co.
v. Barnes & Reineche, 15 N.Y.2d 443, 209 N.E.2d 68, 261 N.Y.S.2d 8 (1965); Rosen v.
Savant Instruments, Inc., 264 F. Supp. 232 (E.D.N.Y. 1967); North Carolina, Bowman v.
Curt G. Joa, Inc., 361 F.2d 706 (4th Cir. 1966) ; Pennsylvania, Miller v. Kiamesha-Concord,
Inc., 420 Pa. 604, 218 A.2d 309 (1966) and Utah, State Tax Comm'n v. Cord, 81 Nev. 403,
404 P.2d 422 (1965).
The alternatives are generally discussed in Aftanase v. Economy Baler Co., 343 F.2d
187 (8th Cir. 1965), followed in Bonhiver v. Louisiana Brokers Exch., Inc., 255 F. Supp. 254
(D. Minn. 1966), pointing out that Minnesota state courts take a liberal approach, Id. at
260, note 13. Cf. Williams v. Connolly, 277 F. Supp. 539 (D. Minn. 1964).
22. Survey II, at 505. Cf. Morrison v. Hampshire Ins. Co., 249 La. 546, 187 So.2d 729
(1966). The court in Delray Beach Aviation Corp. v. Mooney Aircraft, Inc., 332 F.2d 135,
137 (5th Cir. 1964) found that FLA. STAT. § 47.16 (1965) "reflects a purpose to reach as far
as the Federal constitution permits."
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ice on the appropriate public official, who in Florida may be, for example,
the Secretary of State or the Commissioner of Insurance as now expressly
provided in the partly amended section 48.161 of the Florida Statutes.'
Moreover, notice of such service and a copy of the process must be sent
immediately to the defendant by registered or certified mail by the plaintiff or his attorney, but if the defendant is "found without the state,"
process shall be served by "a sheriff . . . of any county . . .inthe state
or jurisdiction where the defendant is found." Unavoidable difficulties
arise where a nonresident defendant declines to accept the registered or
certified letter or does not claim it. As long as postal regulations are not
coordinated with procedural requirements for substituted service, uncertainties will continue to plague the courts. However, in Richardson v.
Williams 4 the court found that the service of process on a defendant who
had concealed himself and refused to accept the certified letter was perfected by serving the Secretary of State under the nonresident motorist
statute. Thus, the notice requirement of section 47.30 of the Florida Statutes was satisfied. The court held that "if the defendant chooses to flout
the notice and refuses to accept it, he will not be permitted to say in the
25
next breath that he has not been served.1
1.

NONRESMENT MOTORISTS

Jurisdictional questions regarding this oldest of long-arm statutes
are well settled, both in regard to the necessary activities involved and
the connexity between the claim and such activities. Difficulties still arise
in regard to the requirements of substituted service. In Zarcone v. Lesser,26 the lower court set aside a default judgment for the plaintiff without
ruling on the question of improper service on the defendant's showing
that the copy of process remained unclaimed according to postal authorities. On appeal the case was reversed on the ground that a justiciable
question was presented as to the validity of service where registered mail
is unclaimed. If the defendant refused to accept delivery of the registered
23. Now expressly regulated in FLA. STAT. § 48.161 (1967):
When authorized by law, substituted service of process on a nonresident . . . by
serving a public officer designated by law shall be made by leaving a copy of the
process . . .with the public officer or in his office. The service is sufficient service
on a defendant who has appointed the public officer as his agent for the service
of process.

24. 201 So.2d 900 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967), regardless of the fact that the court was unable
to maintain its original findings that "[plostal endorsements on the envelopes indicate that

the [defendants] were located and given several notices of the certified mail but never
claimed it," and that "defendants received such notice [by certified letter accompanied by
a copy of the process] they would not accept the letter." However, it seems doubtful whether
or not this ruling would withstand an attack on constitutional grounds as established
in Mulane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
25. Richardson v. Williams, 201 So.2d 900, 903 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967). But cf. Wuchter v.
Pizzuti, 278 U.S. 13 (1928).
26. 190 So.2d 805 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966). Cf. Richardson v. Williams, 201 So.2d 900 (Fla.
2d Dist. 1967). Service of process on motorist concealing his whereabouts, Fernandez v.
Chamberlain, 201 So.2d 781 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967).
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letter, the failure of the plaintiff to file receipts as required by section 47.30
of the Florida Statutes would not invalidate the service. If the failure of
delivery resulted from misdirection by the plaintiff or for some other reason not chargeable to the defendant, there would be no valid service because the statutory requirement of notice would not have been met.
The nonresident motorists provisions contained in section 47.29 of
the Florida Statutes were reenacted by the 1967 Florida legislature as
section 48.171 without change as to substance. However, paragraph (2)
dealing with service on the defendant's administrators, executors or personal representatives is now to be found as paragraph (2) of section
48.161.
2.

NONRESIDENT WATERCRAFT OPERATORS

Florida's nonresident watercraft operators statute was amended in
1965 to include nonresident aircraft operators. In 1967 it was reenacted
as section 48.19 but without the provision regarding aircraft operators.
This change does not affect actions against foreign commercial air carriers
who are amenable to process by virtue of qualifying to do business in
the state under section 48.091 of the Florida Statutes, or under the nonresident business statute.28 However, non-corporate nonresident operators, particularly those operating noncommercial airplanes, will escape
under the amended statute.
3.

BUSINESS BY NONRESIDENTS

This type of long-arm statute seems not only to be the most practical,
but also the most productive of litigation in regard to its substantive requirements. Constitutional overtones are implicit in the required type
of jurisdiction creating activities necessary to trigger the operation of the
statute and in the connexity between the cause of action and such activities within the state.29
A short flash-back may put these problems in a better perspective.
Once the doctrine of nonexistence of a corporation outside of the state
of incorporation was overcome, 80 amenability to such foreign courts was
27. Survey II, at 504. Cf. Meier v. Grimes, 202 So.2d 870 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1967).
28. FLA. STAT. j§ 48.071 (1967).
29. The long-arm statute based on business activities encompasses both nonresident
individuals and foreign corporations. However, the amenability of foreign corporations may

change through the process of qualifying for local activities in pursuance of the applicable
statute, FLA. STAT. § 48.091 (1967). The statute imposes upon such foreign corporations the
duty to file a "certificate designating a resident agent and an office, place of business or
location for the service of process within this state." In respect to foreign corporations
which qualified for local business, no connexity is required. The same section also deals in
paragraph (5) with the right of foreign corporations which have not qualified, to "maintain any action in any court." Cf. FLA. STAT. § 613.04 (1965), Crockin v. Boston Store,
137 Fla. 853, 188 So. 853 (1939), and Rubin v. Kapell, 105 So.2d 28 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1958).
30. Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519 (1839).
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sought on the basis that the foreign corporation acted within the foreign
jurisdiction in the same manner that a natural person would assert his
presence therein. This shift from the simple certainty of nonexistence to
the uncertainties of a fictional presence brought about a mixture of fiction
and fact out of which three unavoidable questions arose. The first demanded an answer as to how the presence of a fictitious entity within a
foreign jurisdiction is to be determined even though a corporation is "a
fiction intended to be acted upon as though it were a fact."'" Such presence, at least for jurisdictional purposes, was seen in the activities performed by the foreign corporation through its officials and agents, a solution "used merely to symbolize those activities of the corporation's agent
within the state which the courts will deem to be sufficient to satisfy the
demands of due process."3 2 The second question turned on the mechanics
of service of process. As a solution, the fiction of the presence of a foreign
corporation through its activities was expanded so as to support an express
or implied appointment of a local agent as authorized to accept service.
Finally, the question arose whether or not a foreign corporation is amenable to local jurisdiction in all actions or only in those related to activities
which resulted in its jurisdictional presence. In regard to connexity, however, no clear-cut rule has emerged.33 In some jurisdictions courts insisted
on connexity. But "there have been instances in which the continuous
corporate operations within a state were thought so substantial and of
such nature as to justify suit against it on causes of action arising entirely
distinct from those activities, '34 provided the acceptance of jurisdiction
31. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
32. Id. at 317. The "corporate presence theory" as labelled in the International Shoe
case (at 316) was defined, e.g., in Philadelphia & Reading Ry. v. McKibbin, 243 U.S. 264,
265 (1917): "A foreign corporation is amenable to process to enforce a personal liability in
the absence of consent, only if it is doing business within the state in such a manner and
to such extent as to warrant the inference that it is present there," and repeated, e.g., in
International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579 (1914), and in People's Tobacco
Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 246 U.S. 79 (1918). For a penetrating analysis see Kurland,
The Supreme Court, the Due Process Clause, and the In Personam Jurisdiction of State
Courts, 1877-1958, 25 U. CHi. L. REv. 569 (1958).
33. Originally, lack of connexity was evaluated as a burden on interstate commerce,
Davis v. Farmers' Co-op. Equity Co., 262 U.S. 312 (1923), on the ground that "this condition imposes upon interstate commerce a serious and unreasonable burden which renders
the statute [not requiring connexity] obnoxious to the commerce clause." Id. at 315. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Wells, 265 U.S. 101 (1924); Michigan Cent. R.R. v. Mix, 278 U.S.
492 (1929) (all cases involving railway companies as defendants). But see Missouri ex rel.
St. Louis B. & M.R.R. v. Taylor, 266 U.S. 200 (1924), and International Milling Co. v.
Columbia Transp. Co., 292 U.S. 511 (1934). For a recent discussion, see Aftanase v. Economy Baler Co., 343 F.2d 187, 196, & n.2 (8th Cir. 1965).
34. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 318 (1945). In Perkins v.
Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952), the Court started from the general
activities of the foreign corporation transacted in the jurisdiction, observing that "if the
corporation carries on, in that state [forum] other continuous and systematic corporate
activities . . . those activities are enough to make it fair and reasonable to subject that
corporation to proceedings in personam in that state, at least as the proceedings in personam seek to enforce causes of action relating to those very activities or to other activities
of the corporation in the state." Id. at 445. However, the Court went one step further and
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is not only supported by "certain minimum contacts," but also does not
offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." 35 By this
quotable rephrasing of a solution already reached, the InternationalShoe
case became the panacea in the area of long-arm statutes, despite the fact
that the Supreme Court was not concerned with such a statute but rather
with the question of simple common law presence of a corporation through
continuous activities under the searching light of constitutional standards.
Common law jurisdiction over a foreign corporation was again at
issue in Hanson v. Denkla.3 6 The Supreme Court tested Florida's claim
to jurisdiction not in the light of its potentially applicable long-arm
statute,3 7 but against contacts which, in the fashion of InternationalShoe,
would have constituted presence in the common law sense of doing business. The Court found that the defendant foreign trust company "has no
office in Florida, and transacts no business there. None of the trust assets
has ever been held or administered in Florida, and the record discloses no
solicitation of business in that State either in person or by mail."38 Furthermore, the Court noted that the cause of action was "not one that arises
out of any act done or transaction consumated in the forum State," and
that the "agreement was executed in Delaware by a trust company incorporated in that State and a settlor domiciled in Pennsylvania. ' 39 Even
though the settlor "carried on several bits of trust administration" in
Florida, there were no instances in which "the trustees performed any
in regard to the requirement of connexity, relying on the InternationalShoe case, found "no
requirement of due process that either prohibits Ohio from opening its courts to the cause
of action here presented, or compels Ohio to do so," Id. at 446. In consequence, it limited its
consideration to the sole question whether "as a matter of federal due process" the business
done in Ohio was "sufficiently substantial and of such a nature as to permit Ohio to entertain the action," Id. at 445. This case was brought into present perspective by the statement
in L.R. Reeder Contractors v. Higgins Indus., 265 F.2d 768, 775 (9th Cir. 1959), admitting
that the Perkins case is "authority for the theory that the cause of action need not arise out
of the activity of the nonresident within the forum state. But this was an earlier case than
either McGee or Hanson, and rests upon its own peculiar facts." Cf. Gordon v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 273 F. Supp. 164, 167 (N.D. Ill. 1967).
35. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). The Supreme Court
of Washington, in International Shoe Co. v. State, 22 Wash. 2d 146, 154 P.2d 801 (1945),
considered the interpretation of the local "doing business" statute. However, the Supreme
Court sidestepped the construction of the statute and its constitutional implications and
preferred to decide the case on already generally accepted common law principles of jurisdiction in the light of minimal constitutional standards.
36. 357 U.S. 235 (1958). See Survey I, at 277. The Court added to the "quality and
nature of the defendant's activity" the additional requirement that "there be some act by
which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities
within the foreign State, thus invoking the benefits and protection of its laws." Id. at 251.
The requirement that such action must have been "taken voluntarily . . . calculated to
have effect in the forum state," was further developed in Rosenblatt v. American Cyanamid Co., 382 U.S. 110 (1965). Cf. Bolt v. Emmco Ins. Co., 271 F. Supp. 366 (D. Mont.
1967).
37. FLA. STAT. § 48.181 (1967).
38. Hanson v. Denkla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958), noted in 13 U. MIAMI L. REv. 246
(1959).
39. Id. at 252.
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acts in Florida."4 Distinguishing this case from McGee v. International
Life Insurance Co.,4 1 the Court found that California had enacted "special legislation [Unauthorized Insurers Process Act] to exercise what the
court called its manifest interest in providing effective redress for citizens." The Court overlooked, however, that Florida also had special legislation in the form of nonresident business as well as unauthorized insurers long-arm statutes which reflect a legitimate interest in redress for
Florida-connected litigation involving nonresident defendants.
It is significant that outside of Hess v. Pawloski42 where the Supreme
Court upheld a nonresident motorist statute under state police powers,
and the numerous statutory foreign railway corporation cases, the only
Supreme Court case dealing with a long-arm statute is McGee v. Inter.
national Life Insurance Co., 43 concerning the California unauthorized in-

surers statute. There the Court found the application of this long-arm
statute to be constitutionally proper since the premiums had been mailed
from the forum state where the insured resided at his death. However, the
relevant factor of the connexity between the claim and the activity within
the jurisdiction was not raised probably because it was too obvious.
When considering Florida law in this area, it must be kept in mind
that the nonresident business statute applies to individual as well as to
corporate defendants. This is significant since it is well established that
under the common law individuals are not considered present for jurisdictional purposes unless they are physically present within the jurisdic4
tion when served with process or are domicilaries of the jurisdiction.
Under the common law a person who has previously acted within a jurisdiction or is acting vicariously in the jurisdiction while physically outside
its borders, is not present within the state for jurisdictional purposes, and
only a statute may subject him to local jurisdiction. Consequently, it may
be said that the old section 47.16 of the Florida Statutes is declaratory of
common law only in regard to foreign corporate defendants45 who "operate, conduct, engage in, or carry on a business" in the state, thus meeting
the requirements as recently expressed in International Shoe.48 By contrast, the Florida statute, like the majority of similar statutes enacted in
other states, presents an innovation over common law in that it applies
the same jurisdiction-creating activities, i.e., one-man ventures, equally to
corporate as well as to individual nonresident defendants. Furthermore,
jurisdiction may also be based on the mere fact that a nonresident defendant, corporate or individual, has an "office or agency in the state." a
40. Id.

41. 359 U.s. 220 (1957).
42.
43.
44.
45.

274 U.S. 352 (1927).
355 U.S. 220 (1957).
Recently discussed in Elliott v. Cabeen, 224 F. Supp. 50, 56 (D. Colo. 1963).
Not qualified to do business in the state, see note 29 supra.

46. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
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contact yet to be construed by Florida courts. Finally, vicarious business
activities by foreign corporate and individual defendants through selling,
consigning, or leasing "by any means whatsoever tangible or intangible
property through brokers, jobbers, wholesalers or distributors" to anybody "within the state" have been added.4 7 In such cases, however, there
is the additional statutory requirement calling for connexity between such
activities and the claim sued upon,48 except under the 1967 statutory
amendment triggered by the Simari case and limited to corporate defendants, to -be discussed below.
A survey of the cases involving the types of jurisdiction-creating activities by nonresidents begins, this time, with the final disposition, at
least insofar as the judiciary is concerned, in the Simari case.4 9 Even
though reversed because of lack of connexity between the claim and the
activities within the jurisdiction,5" the Supreme Court of Florida found,
as indicated in a companion case, Giannini Controls Corporation v. Eubanks,5 that the defendant foreign railway company was transacting
business in the state by maintaining "two permanent offices in Florida
staffed by thirteen permanent employees, for the purpose of soliciting passengers and freight for interstate trips originating in Florida and for
routing such trips," even though these employees did not "issue bills of
lading, collect freight charges, sell passenger tickets, settle claims, or
handle cash transactions of any kind." On the contrary, in the Giannini
case it appeared that the corporate defendant's activities consisted only
of "four visits to the state by personnel [of the defendant] over the
period of a year and a half ... in order to study the ... control systems
and suggest improvements for their maintenance." 52 All of this, however,
did not prevent the court from delving into the secondary question of the
necessary connexity between the claim and the activities even though
the primary jurisdictional requirement based on activities was not met.
47. See Survey I, at 278, and Survey II, at 279.
48. Not required in regard to foreign corporations qualified to do business in the state,
cf. Confederation of Can. Life Ins. v. Vega y Arminan, 135 So.2d 867 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962),
cert. denied, 144 So.2d 805 (Fla. 1962), and under the newly amended FLA. STAT. § 48.081
(1967).

49. Simari v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 179 So.2d 220 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1965) (discussed in
Survey II, at 504), rev'd Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Simari, 191 So.2d 427 (Fla. 1966). In a

similar case involving Illinois law, an opposite result was reached, Lindley v. St. LouisSan Francisco Ry., 276 F. Supp. 83 (N.D. Ill. 1967).
50. Relying on Zirin v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 128 So.2d 594 (Fla. 1961) rather than
on the controlling statutory provision. Half a century ago Pound criticized such practice when courts ignore important legislation '!or, if they do refer to legislation, do so
through the judicial decisions which apply it." Common Law and Legislation, 21 HARv. L.

Rzv. 383 (1908).
S1. 190 So.2d 171 (Fla. 1966).
52. Id. at 172. In Hubsch Mfg. Co. v. Freeway Washer & Stamping Co., 205 So.2d
337 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1967) the application of FLA. STAT. § 47.16 (1965) was supported by
the fact that the non-resident defendant corporation was sending its officers, engineers and
salesmen into Florida and that the damages resulted from the sale and delivery of defective
hardware for use by plaintiff in its Florida operation.

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. XXII

In another case, the court found that the requirements of section 47.16 of
the Florida Statutes regarding the defendant's activities were not met
where a presently nonresident defendant, while employed in a Florida
hospital, allegedly injured the plaintiff. 3 The court held that the "rendition of personal services to an employer" cannot be construed as "engaging in and carrying on a business or business venture within the purview
of the constructive service statute here considered. 54 By contrast, the
fact that the defendant foreign corporation maintained a sales representative who spent forty to fifty percent of his total worktime in Florida,
calling on customers to promote sales, accepting complaints, quoting
prices, but without writing orders, was held sufficient "minimum contact"
55
in Phillips v. Hooker Chemical Corporation.
A business venture was at issue in Lomas & Nettleton F. Corp. v. All
56 Here
Coverage Underwriters.
the court found that the defendant, incorporated in Delaware and having its only office in Texas, was "doing
business in Florida," because "on at least two occasions defendant was
engaged in financing the construction of improvements to real estate in
Florida. In each instance the mortgages were to be serviced by the defendant's wholly owned subsidiary with offices in Miami." 5 Moreover,
the court noticed that the "resident vice president of the subsidiary,
which acted as a mortgage broker, was also an assistant secretary of the
defendant." Declining to use the "broader ground for finding the defendant subject to the terms of the Long Arm Statute," the court chose to
rely on the "business venture" concept, which "criterion can be met by
a lesser involvement than that required for doing business."5 8 In a similar
vein, the court in O'Connel v. Loach59 held that the nonresident defendant who bought and sold land in Florida and listed a tract for sale with
the plaintiff broker, was "engaging in a business venture" if not actually
engaging in business in Florida.6"
Vicarious business activities as defined in paragraph (2) of the old
section 47-16 of the Florida Statutes6 ' were involved in Evershield Products, Inc. v. Sapp.62 The district court of appeals accepted the trial
court's findings that the defendant foreign corporation was engaged in
business through a Florida corporation as "broker, jobber or distributor"
of its materials because "strong economic ties" existed between the two
53. Williams v. Duval Co. Hosp. Auth., 199 So.2d 299 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1967).
54. Id. at 302.
55. 375 F.2d 189 (5th Cir. 1967).
56. 200 So.2d 564 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1967).
57. Id. at 565.
58. Id. In Smeltzer v. Deere & Co., 252 F. Supp. 552, 556 (W.D. Pa. 1966), the court
pointed out that Pennsylvania lacks a comparable statute.
59. 203 So.2d 350 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967), rev'g 194 So.2d 700 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967).
60. The court relied on the leading case State ex rel. Weber v. Register, 67 So.2d 619
(Fla. 1953).
61. See Survey II, at 510.
62. 195 So.2d 10 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967).
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companies, as indicated by the existence of substantial monetary credit,
sales assistance and advertising materials as well as the sales and distribution of the defendant's products to be "used and serviced in Florida."
A telling point was the fact that the Florida corporation came into being
when officers of the defendant foreign corporation "decided to form the
corporation and go into business in the State of Florida. . . as the official
applicators"63 of the defendant's materials.
Whether or not a long-arm statute may be applied retroactively so
as to include activities that occurred prior to its enactments was at issue
in Haberle v. P.R.O. Liquidating Company.64 The activity within the
jurisdiction consisted of a sale in 1950 of an X-ray machine. The lack of
proper shielding resulted in injury to the plaintiff and was not discovered
until 1961. In a decision involving no constitutional overtones, 65 it was
held that the defendant was not subject to service under the statute in
the absence of a showing that it had engaged in business within the jurisdiction since the enactment of the statute.
Questions of connexity present fewer difficulties once the nature of
the particular jurisdiction-creating activity has been properly established.
In the previously discussed Simari66 case, the Supreme Court of Florida
quashed the appellate decision 7 because of the lack of such relationship
between the activity within the jurisdiction and the claim, quoting not the
express statutory provision but the Zirin"8 and InternationalShoe69 cases.
In Manus v. Manus,7' an action for divorce, alimony, and support for a
minor, the court found that "neither the complaint nor the proofs submitted on the issue of jurisdiction disclose any cause of action that arose
out of anything that [the defendant] allegedly did or any obligation it
incurred in Florida," and added that "due process of law requirements
limit all of our service of process statutes based on the 'doing business'
theory to obligations or cause of action which arose out of activities of the
foreign corporation in this state."'1 Similarly, the court in O'Connel v.
Loach72 held that a complaint which does not even allege that the claim
arose out of the business activities of the defendant within the jurisdic63. Id. at 14.
64. 186 So.2d 280 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1966). Accord, Meier v. Grimes, 202 So.2d 870 (Fla.
4th Dist. 1967); Majerus v. Walk, 275 F. Supp. 952 (D. Minn. 1967).
65. McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957); cf. Hardy v. Rekab,
Inc., 266 F. Supp. 508 (D. Md. 1967).
66. Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Simari, 191 So.2d 427 (Fla. 1966).
67. Followed in Bradbery v. Frank L. Savage, Inc., 190 So.2d 183 (Fla. 4th Dist.
1966), evaluating the opinion as "scholarly," Id. at 184.
68. Zirin v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 128 So.2d 594 (Fla. 1961). See Survey I, at 284.
69. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
70. 193 So.2d 236 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1966).
71. Id. at 238, implying connexity to be a due process requirement. United States v.
Montreal Trust Co., 358 F.2d 239 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 919 (1966), holds
connexity to be a "mandate of International Shoe Co." and the New York long-arm
statute requiring cornexity not vulnerable on constitutional grounds.
72. 194 So.2d 700 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967).
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tion, will not support personal jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant.
In FederalInsurance Company v. Michigan Wheel Company" a motion
to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction was granted on the ground that the
claim "could have accrued without any and all of [the defendant's] activities, for it is entirely independent of and unrelated to them." The court
held that "although Florida may have McGee-declared constitutional
power ... to flex its jurisdictional muscles more strongly, it has chosen,
by its legislature and its Supreme Court, not to do so and has firmly established the above limitation [a connexity between the business activity
'
within the jurisdiction and the claim] on its long arm statute."74
In order to be effective, constructive as well as other types of service
of process must meet requirements set out in the particular long-arm
statutes. Such requirements often demand more than the bare constitutional minimum. It follows that service under a long-arm statute may be
ineffective because of non-compliance with frequently cumulative methods
even though the service as performed might have met minimum consti73. 267 F. Supp. 639 (S.D. Fla. 1967).
74. Id. at 640. May connexity as a constitutional requirement be dispensed with in
case where the activity on the part of the foreign corporation is continuous and considerable, as distinguished from the one-act long-arm situations? Missouri K. & T. Ry. v.
Reynolds, 255 U.S. 565 (1921), as wen as Tanza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 220 N.Y. 250,
115 N.E. 915 (1917) would indicate support. But see Old Wayne Mutual Life Ass'n v. McDough, 204 U.S. 8 (1907); Green v. Chicago B. & Q. Ry., 205 U.S. 530 (1907). Stepping "tuft from tuft across the morras," Hutchinson v. Chase, 45 F.2d 139, 141 (2d Cir.
1930), courts apparently move in this direction. Cf. Volkswagen Interamericana v. Rohlsen,
360 F.2d 437, 440 (1st Cir. 1966).
In Gordon v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 273 F. Supp. 164, 167 (N.D. Ill.), for
example, the court wrote:
The evolution reflected by InternationalShoe could have been limited to situations
where forum state activities were related to the suit in which jurisdiction was
asserted. However, the Supreme Court in InternationalShoe recognized cases where
jurisdiction had been grounded on substantial forum state activities unrelated to
the cause in suit. That substantial unrelated activities within the forum state could
support in personam jurisdiction over a nonresident was affirmed in Perkins v.
Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
Exploring "sufficient affiliation with the State of Florida," the Supreme Court in Hanson v.
Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958), found that "The cause of action in this case is not one that
arises out of an act done or transaction consumated in the forum State," Id. at 251, and
distinguished McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957) on this ground.
A further weakening of the requirement of connexity is indicated in Frummer v. Hilton
Hotels Int'l, Inc., 19 N.Y.2d 533, 227 N.E.2d 851 (1967) holding an English corporation
amenable to New York courts for claims arising out of plaintiff's fall in the bathtub of the
London hotel, on the ground that the foreign corporation was doing business in New York in
the "traditional sense," i.e., according to common law principles in force prior to the
enactment of the long-arm statute, which jurisdictional rules remained in force under Section 301 of the N.Y. Civ. Prac. L., as amended in 1966, providing that a court may exercise jurisdiction "as might have been exercised heretofore." The question of connexity has
not even been raised. Cf. Gelfand v. Tanner Motor Tours, Ltd., 385 F.2d 116 (2d Cir.
1967).
In Woodham v. Northwestern Steel & Wire Co., 390 F.2d 27 (5th Cir. 1968) the appellate court sidestepped the requirement of connexity (FLA. STAT. § 47.16, 1965) by interpreting the (old) § 47.17(4) as establishing jurisdiction regardless of connexity and not
as identifying persons authorized to accept service on behalf of a foreign corporation for
purposes of notification.
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tutional standards. Service under the old section 47.15 of the Florida
Statutes upon an agent "transacting business for [the foreign corporation]
in this state" was involved in Bradbery v. Frank L. Savage, Inc.75 The
court found that this agent displayed merchandise, solicited business,
received and forwarded orders for which he received salary plus commission, and, therefore, qualified as a statutorily constituted agent for service of process. A related but not identical jurisdictional requirement is,
of course, that of the defendant's own local activities under the old section 47.16 of the Florida Statutes. Finally, it may be noted that where
the defendant foreign corporation ignores service upon its agent within the
jurisdiction as in Evershield Products, Inc. v. Sapp76 (decided on the
77
authority of Delray Beach Aviation Corp. v. Mooney Aircraft, Inc.),
it was held to have received sufficient notice of action through its local
affiliate in the sense of the old section 47.16(2) of the Florida Statutes.
In 1967 the legislature redrafted, renumbered and in some instances
amended Florida's jurisdictional statutes. The nonresident business statute contained in the old section 47.16, now renumbered as section 48.181,
underwent no substantive changes. Service of process may be had on the
Secretary of State or, as added in 1967, on a "resident agent or officer in
the state," an addition unnecessary in view of section 48.081 which reenacted the former section 47.17. Consequently, the former paragraph
(2) dealing with transacting business through brokers, jobbers, wholesalers or distributors, became paragraph (3).
The provisions of former section 47.161 of the Florida Statutes, now
section 48.071, dealing with jurisdiction over individuals and partnerships
"not residing or having their principal place of business in this state,"
underwent no changes. Such nonresidents will remain amenable to local
jurisdiction provided they "engage in business in this state" and the action arises out of such business. Service of process may be had on the person "in charge of any business in which the defendant is engaged within
this state at the time of service," or on "agents soliciting orders for goods,
wares, merchandise or services."
A trend to dispense with the requirement of connexity in nonresident
business statutes is apparent in a subsequent amendment to the already
revised section 47.17, now section 48.081, of the Florida Statutes. Apparently in response to the difficulties encountered in the Simari7 1 litigation,
the legislature decided to favor actions against foreign corporations by
providing that:
(5) Where a corporation has a business office within the state
and is actually engaged in the transaction of business
75.
76.
77.
78.
note 49

190 So.2d 183 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1966).
195 So.2d 10 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967).
332 F.2d 133 (5th Cir. 1964). See Survey II, at 511.
Simari v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 179 So.2d 220 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1965). See discussion
supra.
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therefrom, service upon any officer or business agent, resident in the state, may personally be made, pursuant to
this section, and it is not necessary in such case, that the
action, suit or proceeding against the corporation shall
have arisen out of any transaction or operation connected
with or incidental to the business being transacted within
the state.
In other words, the requirement of connexity does not apply in actions
against foreign corporations not qualified to transact business in Florida,
provided they have a "business office and [are] actually engaged in the
transaction of business therefrom." Even though this amendment affects
the jurisdictional provisions contained in the former section 47.16 and the
present section 48.081 of the Florida Statutes, it was inserted into the
former section 47.17, presently section 48.081, which deals with the routine method of service provided that jurisdictional requirements under the
present section 48.081 are met.
Two observations may be made when comparing this provision with
that reenacted in section 48.181. The line of distinction between corporate
activities required under section 48.181, which uses, among others, the
contact of having an office in the state, and that of section 47.17(8) (now
numbered as section 48.081.(5)) relying on having a "business office
within the state and [being] actually engaged in the transaction of
business therefrom," appears too thin to present a workable tool, particularly since one of them relieves the plaintiff of the burden of showing
connexity. Rather, it appears as an unwelcome invitation to procedural
pettifoggery. There is also uncertainty posed by paragraph (5), namely,
whether service of process provided therein "upon any officer or business
agent, resident in the state" is in addition to methods available in section
48.081, particularly since the method of service adopted in this amendment is also available in the new section 48.081 (1) (d).
Summarizing, first, the statutory provisions presently dealing with
the jurisdiction over foreign corporations transacting business in Florida,
the following unnecessarily complex picture emerges:
(1)

Foreign corporations which have qualified to transact business
in Florida are amenable to any kind of actions with service on
designated agents;79

(2)

Foreign corporations not qualified to "transact business in
Florida" may become amenable to local jurisdiction provided
they
(a)

"operate, conduct, engage in, or carry on a business or
business venture in the state, or .. .have an office or
agency in the state," and the cause of action arises "out

79. FLA. STAT. § 48.091 (1967).

1968]

CONFLICT OF LAWS

(b)

(c)
(d)

of any transaction or operation connected with or incidental to the business or business venture;" or
have "a business office within the state and [are] actually engaged in the transaction of business therefrom,"
without the need that the cause of action "shall have
arisen out of any transaction or operation connected
with or incidental to the business being transacted within
the state;" 0 or
engage in unauthorized insurance business; 8 ' or
have acted in connection with their business activities
within the state so as to bring themselves within the allong-arm statutes, all of
ternate scope of the remaining
82
them requiring connexity.

In regard to nonresident individuals transacting business in the
state, the method of subjecting them to local jurisdiction through the
process of qualification is not available. Hence, only patterns available
for foreign corporations which have not qualified for local business, remain:
(1) The general nonresident business statute contained in Florida
Statutes, section 48.181 quoted in its crucial provisions above
under (2) (a), requiring the defined activity as well as connexity;
(2) Florida Statutes, section 48.071 applicable to natural persons
and partnerships "not residing or having his or their principal
place of business in this state," and engaging in business in this
state coupled with the requirement of connexity;
(3) By having acted, in connection with their business, so as to
bring themselves within the alternate scope of other long-arm
statutes, all of them requiring connexity.
In conclusion, it may be pointed out that the recent revisions and
amendments have created new uncertainties rather than eliminated old
ones. It is to be regretted that instead of giving Florida a simple, compact,
general long-arm statute like those in force in many states, the legislature
has chosen to compound existing difficulties by retaining the old patchwork and by adding, for good measure, a few new patches on top of it all.
4. UNAUTHORIZED FOREIGN INSURERS
The 1967 legislature adopted in paragraph (1) of the Unauthorized
Insurers Process Law 3 a policy statement enlarging that already con80.
81.
82.
83.

FLA. STAT. § 48.081(5) (1967).
See Survey I, at 288.
See Survey I, at 281, and Survey II, at 503.
FLA. STAT. § 626.05071 (1967). On service, see United States v. St. Paul Mercury
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tained in section 626.0504 of the Florida Statutes. Jurisdiction of the
Commissioner of Insurance was defined in paragraph (2) of the same
section.
5.

NONRESIDENT CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONS AND SOLICITORS

The 1967 legislature reenacted section 496.1284 of the Florida Statutes dealing with foreign charitable organizations and expanded it to
include professional solicitors. Even though such organizations or agents
may have their "principal place of business without the state, or [be]
organized under and by virtue of the laws of a foreign state," if "they
solicit contributions from people in this state," they are deemed to have
appointed the Secretary of State as their agent for service in any proceedings "brought under the provisions of this act."
6.

NONRESIDENT PARTNERSHIPS

Foreign partnerships 5 are amenable to local jurisdiction under any
of the long-arm statutes if they engage in business under sections 48.071,
48.171 and 48.19 of the Florida Statutes or operate a motor vehicle or
watercraft within the jurisdiction. The method of service is prescribed by
the particular long-arm statute or by section 48.061(1). However, in
cases of doing business under section 48.071, a particular method of
service is prescribed and the provisions of section 48.061 (1) are unavailable to the plaintiff.
Foreign limited partnerships may be served according to section
48.061(3) on any general partner found in the state. If "no general partner is found in Florida," process may be served according to sections
48.071 and 48.21.
7.

FOREIGN LAND DEVELOPERS

The newly amended statute regulating promotional real estate offerings grants jurisdiction over causes of action arising under its provisions
to the circuit courts. Civil remedies, now available under section 478.191
(1) and (2), may be sought in Florida courts, provided:
6

(1)

the subdivided lands offered for disposition are located in
this state; or

Ins. Co., 361 F.2d 838 (5th Cir. 1966). Statute found constitutional in Parmalee v. Iowa
State Traveling Men's Ass'n, 206 F.2d 518 (5th Cir. 1953).
Corporations engaged in insured scholarship programs (FLA. STAT. § 617.50 (1967)),

domestic and foreign, must irrevocably appoint the Commissioner of Insurance as agent
for service "of all legal process issued against [them] in any civil action and proceeding
in this state," this authority to remain in effect "as long as there is outstanding any obligation or liability of the corporation resulting from its business transactions therein." FLA.
STAT. §
84.
85.
86.

617.80 (1967). For statutory construction, see Survey I, at 287.
See Survey II, at 512.
See Survey I, at 286.
FMA. STAT. ch. 478 (1967).
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(2)

the subdivider's principal office is located in this state; or

(3)

any offer or disposition of subdivided lands is made in
this state or is directed by the offeror to a person or place
in this state and received by the person or at the place to
which it is directed.

Subdividers are required by section 478.121 (1) (a) to appoint irrevocably in their application for registration an "agency to receive service
of any lawful process on any noncriminal proceedings arising under this
act against the applicant or his personal representative.18 7 If this is not
done, section 478.291 (2) provides that:
If any person, including any nonresident of this state, engages
in conduct prohibited by this act, or any rule or order hereunder,
and has not filed a consent to service of process and personal
jurisdiction over him cannot otherwise be obtained in this State,
that conduct authorizes the board to receive service of process
in any noncriminal proceeding against him or his successor which
grows out of that conduct and which is brought under this act
or any rule or order hereunder, with the same force and validity
as if served on him personally.
In that event, notice is given under section 478.291 (1) by delivering process to the office of the board to become effective only if a copy is "forthwith sent by certified mail to the defendant at his last known address and
plaintiff's affidavit of compliance with this provision is filed with the
court."
B.

Jurisdictionin Rem

Many cases where jurisdiction is based upon the location of the real
property involved are contested because the mode of service required under the applicable statute may be constructive. In Vanstone v. Whitelaw,
the defendants, residents of Canada and owners of land in Florida, were
sued in an action to abate a nuisance on their property. Constructive
service by publication was upheld as not violative of the due process and
equal protection clauses of the Federal Constitution because the defendants were "properly named parties defendant in an action seeking the
89
exercise of state court jurisdiction over real property within this state.7
Justice Ervin filed a weighty dissent, pointing out that the action aiming
at removal of spoil disposal put on the defendants' property by the government is an action in equity in personam and not an action in rem and,
as such, requires perfection of jurisdiction over the persons of the defendants.°
87. FLA. STAT. § 478.121(1) (a).
88. 196 So.2d 425 (Fla. 1967). Cf. Wilentz v. Edwards, 134 N.J. Eq. 522, 36 A.2d 423
(Ct. Err. & App. 1944).
89. 196 So.2d 425, 426 (Fla. 1967).
90. Id. at 428.
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The sufficiency of constructive service was also at issue in Hennig v.
Hennig,9 ' an action by a husband to establish title to realty which had
been awarded to his wife in a previous divorce decree. Despite a strong
dissent, the Supreme Court of Florida discharged the defendant's petition
of certiorari on the ground that constructive service on the husband in
the divorce proceedings did not perfect jurisdiction regarding this property held by the entireties because it was not properly described in the
notice by publication. Consequently, the divorce decree awarding husband's interest in this property to the wife was subject to collateral attack.
C. Forum Non Conveniens
The doctrine of forum non conveniens was at issue in Texas Gulf
Sulphur Company v. Downtown Investment Company.92 The lower court
denied the defendant's motion to dismiss based on this doctrine on the
ground that Florida has no statute comparable to Title 28, section
1404(2) of the United States Code. The district court of appeals dismissed the interlocutory appeal stating that the "Florida venue statute
specifies the forums in which an action may be commenced," and, relying
on Touchton v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad," an intrastate venue case,
held that the principle enunciated in that case was "equally applicable to
actions properly brought in Florida where it is made to appear that a more
convenient forum may be found in another state."
Fortunately, Florida law was stated correctly in the later case of
Southern Railway v. McCubbins.4 There the appellate court recognized
the doctrine as "one which is sanctioned by the law of this state, where
the cause of action arises in another jurisdiction and neither party resides
in Florida,"9 5 and on rehearing, reversed the denial of a motion to dismiss
and found abuse of discretion on the part of the court below for overlooking the following facts present in the case:
astute forum shopping; an exercise of strategy to force the
trial at a distant place inconvenient and expensive to an adversary and thereby including a measure of harassment; inaccessibility to sources of proof; unavailability of compulsory process
for attendance of unwilling witnesses; cost of employment of
91. 185 So.2d 457 (Fla. 1966).
92. 188 So.2d 19 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1966).
93. 155 So.2d 738 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963). Cf. Gallen v. Howard D. Johnson Co., 271 F.
Supp. 680 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) granting transfer to Florida under 28 U.S.C., § 1404(a), taking
into account that witnesses are in Florida, that Florida statutory and common law would
have to be applied, that a view of the premises would be possible, that the dockets of the
Florida federal court "are less congested," and finally, that the plaintiff has chosen to do
business in Florida and that the controversy developed there.
94. 196 So.2d 512 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967). The doctrine is not adopted in Louisiana,
Trahan v. Phoenix Ins. Co., - La. -, 200 So.2d 118 (1967); Chaney v. Williher, La. -, 205 So.2d 770 (Ct. App. 1968).
95. 196 So.2d 512, 514 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967) ; Hagen v. Viney, 124 Fla. 746, 169 So. 391
(1936).
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additional counsel at the place selected for trial; loss of opportunity for a jury view of the premises, where such may become
important; no substantial difference in the time in which such
a case may be reached for trial in the courts of the two locations;
no necessity to resort to a forum in another state in order to
obtain a fair trial; an undue and unnecessary imposition on a
busy Florida court by adding to its docket a cause of action
arising elsewhere between nonresident litigants; and all other
practical problems that make trial of a case easier and more expeditious and inexpensive in the forum in the state where the
cause of action arose, the parties reside and where normally it
would be filed."
D. Litispendency
Litispendency was involved in Orlowitz v. Orlowitz. 7 The appellate
court held that jurisdiction in the divorce suit should have been reserved
pending determination of the wife's suit against her husband in Florida
for unpaid, accrued alimony based on a Pennsylvania separate maintenance decree, because if the Pennsylvania decree should be found invalid
or unenforceable, the amount to be awarded in the Florida divorce action
would be affected.
E. Immunity from Process
Even though the general doctrine of sovereign immunity in favor of
the State of Florida still obtains, 98 the 1967 Florida Legislature altered
the rule for tort actions wherein the state is the plaintiff to the extent of
"permitting the defendant to counter-claim for damages resulting from
the same transaction or occurrence. ' 99
F. Federal Law
There are some interesting developments in the area of federal law.
Section 1391 of Title 28 of the United States Code was amended in 1964
by adding paragraph (f) dealing with venue of civil actions arising out of
automobile accidents. Paragraph (f) was merged in 1966 with paragraphs
(a) and (b) as follows:
(a) A civil action wherein jurisdiction is founded only on
diversity of citizenship may, except as otherwise provided
by law be brought only in the judicial district where all
plaintiffs or all the defendants reside, or in which the cause
of action arose.
96. 196 So.2d 512, 516 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967). Forum non conveniens involving Florida
resident in New York, Varkonyi v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense, 27 App.
Div. 2d 731, 277 N.Y.2d 577 (1967).
97. 187 So.2d 670 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
98. Valdez v. State Rd. Dep't, 189 So.2d 823 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966).
99. Fla. Laws 1967, ch. 67-2204.
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A civil action wherein jurisdiction is not founded solely on
diversity of citizenship may be brought only in the judicial
district where all defendants reside, or in which the claim
arose, except as otherwise provided by law.

Consequently, paragraph (f) was repealed.
In the international area, it should be noted that the Convention on
the Service of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil and Commercial Matters, signed at The Hague in 1965, has been ratified by the
United States, but is not yet in force.' 00
III.

FOREIGN JUDGMENTS

On the interstate level the Supreme Court was faced in Watkins v.
Conway, 1" with the constitutional implications of a denial of full faith
and credit. Relying on the Georgia lex ori rule that "all suits upon judgments obtained out of this State shall be brought within five years after
such judgments shall have been obtained,"'0 2 a Georgia court refused to
give full faith and credit to a "dormant"'10 Florida judgment. The Court
held that in view of the Georgia interpretation of its statute whereby suits
on foreign judgments are barred only if the plaintiff cannot "revive his
judgment in the State where it was originally obtained" and that the
critical date is "not the date of the original judgment, but rather it is the
date of latest revival of the judgment," the Georgia statute as applied in
this instance did not discriminate against the judgment from Florida, but
rather:
it has focused on the law of the State. If Florida had a statute
of limitations of five years or less on its own judgments, the
[plaintiff] would not be able to recover here. But this disability
would flow from the conclusion of the Florida Legislature that
suits on Florida judgments should be barred after that period.
Georgia's construction of § 3-701 would merely honor and give
effect to that conclusion. Thus, full faith and credit is insured,
rather than denied, the law of the judgement State. Similarly,
there is no denial of equal protection in a scheme that relies upon
the judgment State's view of the validity of its own judgments.
Such a scheme hardly reflects invidious discrimination.' 4
The defendant's attempt to collaterally attack a California paternity
judgment in Florida under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Sup100. 61 Am. J. INT'L L. 799 (1967).
101. 385 U.S. 188 (1966).
102. GA. CODE ANN. § 3-701 (1933).
103. For the medieval doctrine of dormant judgments revived by the princely kiss of
scire jadas, see Union Bank v. Powell, 3 Fla. 175, 191 (1850) ; Massey v. Pineapple Orange
Co., 87 Fla. 374, 100 So. 170 (1924); and Spurway v. Dyer, 48 F. Supp. 255 (S.D. Fla.
1942).
104. Watkins v. Conway, 385 U.S. 188, 190 (1966).

1968]
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port Act was unsuccessful in view of the controlling California law that
the defendant's only available remedy was a timely and direct attack by
appeal from the default judgment obtained after the defendant had been
personally served in California. 105 Estoppel by judgment was found in
InternationalBreweries, Inc. v. Anheuser-Bush, Inc.,'01 where the plaintiff had recovered a declaratory judgment in a federal court in Ohio granting protection against the use by defendant's privy of the trademark
"Bavarian." Similarly in Meyers v. Forty-Five Twenty-Five, Inc.,10 7 a
New York judgment against a husband and wife for unpaid rent prevented the relitigation in Florida of a suit for damages by the wife previously pleaded without success as a defense in a New York action. 10 8
Full faith and credit to a New York judgment obtained by plaintiff
attorneys who "rendered professional services to defendant while he was
a domiciliary of New York" but was at the time of the commencement of the suit a domiciliary of Florida was (even though not noted)
involved in Brown v. Henrich.0 9 Jurisdiction in the New York action
was perfected under the New York long-arm statute subjecting to local
jurisdiction any non-domiciliary if he transacts any business in person
within the state and there is connexity between such activity and the demand. 1,0 The appellate court felt that "there has been some confusion in
the New York law as to whether or not CPLR 302 would apply to a nondomiciliary who was domiciled in New York at the time of the transaction
in question.""' Reading a New York case as holding that "CPLR 302
does apply to a defendant who was domiciled in New York at the
time he transacted the business but a non-domiciliary at the time of
service,""' 2 the court supposedly applied "the law prevailing at the
105. Holcomb v. Holcomb, 198 So.2d 32 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1967).
106. 364 F.2d 261 (5th Cir. 1966).
107. 198 So.2d 650 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967).
108. In the unreported case of Oppenheim v. World Wide Realty & Investing Corp.,
NO. 66-1221 (S.D. Fla. 1967), an action upon a judgment obtained in Illinois upon a
cognovit note dated and payable in Illinois, but in fact executed in Florida, was dismissed
on the ground that plaintiff did not show the judgment is valid under the controlling Illinois statute, ILa.. Ars. STAT. ch. 10, § 50(4) (1966 Supp.).
109. 203 So.2d 183 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1967).

Arbitral awards rendered according to art. 50, 51, and 52 of the Convention on the
Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (1966,
17 U.S.T. 1270, T.I.A.S. No. 6090) are, under art. 1650 (a) of 22 U.S.C.A. (1967), recognized as rights "arising under a treaty of the United States, and, insofar as they impose

a pecuniary obligation, "shall be enforced and shall be given the same full faith and credit
as if the award were a final judgment of a court of general jurisdiction of one of the several
states." Federal district courts are vested with "exclusive jurisdiction over [such] actions
and proceedings . . . regardless of the amount in controversy."
110. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. § 302(a) (McKinney 1963).
111. Brown v. Henrich, 203 So.2d 183, 184 (Fla. 1967).
112. State v. Davies, 18 N.Y.2d 950, 223 N.E.2d 570, 277 N.Y.S.2d 146 (1966). The
court's reliance on this case is patently misplaced since § 203 of the CPLR requires no

present or past domicile on the part of defendant. Rather it uses domicile only as a fictional and meaningless justification for the long-arm jurisdictional grant by stating thiat

"any non-domiciliary" may be subject to local jurisdiction because of his transacting, in
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time it renders its decision,"' " and reversed, directing-correctly- summary judgment for the plaintiff. It may be added, however, that the
New York court's finding that professional legal services are equivalent
to transacting business in person on the part of the client may be unusual.114 Nevertheless, in a full faith and credit situation, a wrong interpretation of the forum's jurisdictional rules will not deprive the judgment
thus rendered of full faith and credit except where their application
amounts to denial of due process, a possibility not even raised in the case.
Among cases concerning Florida judgments to be enforced in other
states, Higginbotham v. Higginbotham", deserves to be mentioned. As
previously reported," 6 the lower New Jersey court denied full faith and
credit to a Florida alimony decree in regard to land, but granted it in
regard to chattels. On appeal the Superior Court faced two impressive
precedents, one local, Bullock v. Bullock," 7 and the other national, Fall v.
Estin."8 The former was overcome by finding that it could not be "considered binding authority because the court there was hopelessly divided.""' 9 Fall v. Estin was distinguished on three grounds. First, the defendant there was not personally served in Fi, namely the State of
Washington. Secondly, F2, Nebraska, had no remedy to award real estate
as alimony and, consequently, was not compelled under the full faith and
credit clause to "recognize an award or order (i.e., Washington's) which
20
the equity courts in Nebraska could not themselves lawfully render.'

Thirdly, in that case the plaintiff sued on the theory that the Washington
decree in itself affected the title to the Nebraska land, and placed the
title in the plaintiff. In the present case, however, the court relied on personal jurisdiction perfected over the defendant both in Florida and New
person, business in New York "in the same manner as if he were a domiciliary of the
state." Furthermore, the New York case dealt not with the question of present or past
domicile, but with the specific question whether or not this statute applies to actions
"penal rather than tortious in nature," Id. at 951, 233 N.E.2d at 571, 277 N.Y.S.2d at 147,
and held that in spite of the fact that the action "sought redress for a public wrong rather
than a private wrong, it was a civil proceeding and was therefore governed by CPLR
302." Id.
113. Brown v. Henrich, 203 So.2d 183, 184 (Fla. 1967).
114. "Transacting any business within the state" N.Y. CIv. PRAC. L. § 302 (McKinney
1963) includes also acting in a state court, Drugor Shipping Corp. v. Union Tank Car Co.,
361 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 831 (1966) ; and execution in N.Y. of a
separation agreement and deposit security therefor, Van Wagenberg v. Van Wagenberg, 241
Md. 154, 215 A.2d 812 (1966), cert. denied. 385 U.S. 833 (1966). But see Ohio Cas. Ins.
Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 425 P.2d 934 (Okla. 1967)
115. 92 N.J. Super. 18, 222 A.2d 120 (1966).
116. See Survey II, at 519.
117. 52 N.J. Eq. 561, 30 A. 676 (1894).
118. 215 U.S. 1 (1909). Hancock, Full Faith and Credit to Foreign Laws and Judgments in Real Property Litigation: the Supreme Court and the Land Taboo, 18 STAN. L.
REV. (1966). For a recent judicial evaluation of Fall v. Estin, in the light of McElreath v.
McElreath, 162 Tex. 190, 345 S.W.2d 722 (1961), see Allis v. Allis, 378 F.2d 721 (5th
Cir. 1967).
119. Higginbotham v. Higginbotham, 92 N.J. Super. 18, 22, 222 A.2d 120, 122 (1966).
120. Id. at 33, 222 A.2d at 128.

CONFLICT OF LAWS

Jersey rather than on the in rem effect of the Florida decree over land in
New Jersey and directed the lower court to enter judgment for the plaintiff and issue any order "necessary to give her a fee simple" in the land
involved. 2' This was granted in spite of Florida's indulgence in the "formalism" displayed in her decree that
it be considered and taken in all courts of law and equity to have
the same operation and effect as if the conveyance ... had been
executed by the defendant ...and [Florida's court order] to its

special master to execute and deliver a deed to plaintiff after
defendant, in disregard of the decree and the court's ne exeat
order, fled the jurisdiction.' 22
IV.

ERIE-KLAXON DOCTRINE

A.

General Problems

No significant developments may be noted in the Erie-Klaxon doctrine. Some of its aspects have been restated in Commissioner v. Estate
of Bosch," referring to the Rule of Decision Act that in the absence of
the Constitution or acts of Congress, the "laws of the several states ...
shall be regarded as rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of the
United States, in cases where they apply.' 24 While the decrees of lower
state courts should be given some weight, such decisions are not controlling "where the highest court of the state has not spoken."1 25 The rulings
of intermediate state courts are a "datum for ascertaining state law," and
not to be disregarded by federal courts "unless [they are] convinced by
other persuasive data the highest court of the state would decide otherwise."' ' Consequently, the Court in the Bosch case concluded that "under
some conditions, federal authority may not be bound even by an intermediate state appellate court ruling."' 27 Although this was not a diversity
case, the Court held that the Erie doctrine may be applied "for the same
reasons, viz., the underlying substantive rule involved is based on state
law and the State's highest court is the best authority on its own law,"
and "if there be no decision by that court then federal authority must
121. Id. at 36, 222 A.2d at 130.

122. Id. at 35, 222 A.2d at 129. On full faith and credit due to Puerto Rican judgment,
see Americana of Puerto Rico, Inc. v. Kaplus, 368 F.2d 431 (3d Cir. 1966). Florida judgment against incompetent not entitled to full faith and credit in New York because of
failure to appoint in Florida a guardian ad litem, in addition to New York's exclusive
jurisdiction, In re Raffa, 24 A.D.2d 949, 261 N.Y.S.2d 423 (1965). In Esser v. Cantor, 284
N.Y.2d 914 (1967), a Florida judgment based on section 47.16(2) of the Florida Statutes
was given full faith and credit in New York, the court finding that "minimum contacts
required by the Florida statute do not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."
123. 387 U.S. 456 (1967).
124. Id. at 464.
125. King v. Order of United Commercial Travelers, 333 U.S. 153, 161 (1948).
126. Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 35 U.S.L.W. 4542, 4545 (U.S. June 5, 1967).
127. Id.
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apply what it finds to be the state law after giving 'proper regard' to relevant rulings of the other courts of the State. In this respect, it may be
28
said to be, in effect, sitting as a state court.'
In proper Erie cases it appears that federal courts still swing between
two extremes: that of being "only another court of the state"' 29 or that
of being a judiciary with an independent identity.' 10 Relying on Byrd v.
Blue Ridge Rural Electric Co-Operative,'3 ' the court in Prudential Insurance Company of America v. Schreflfer- 2 held that the question of
what "circumstances justify the setting aside of a jury verdict, like other
questions concerning the judge-jury relationship in the federal courts, is
governed by federal law."' 3 The question of the sufficiency of evidence
was involved in ABC-Paramount Records, Inc. v. Topps Record Distributing Co.'3 4 There the court noted that both parties "argue the question of
sufficiency of evidence as if it were a question of Florida law,"'8 5 and
again relying on the Byrd case held that
[T]he federal court's judge-jury relationship would suffer a
similar disruption if the trial judge had to apply the Florida
rather than the federal standard of sufficiency of evidence in
determining whether to take away from the jury certain fact
issues concerning damages, 3 6
and added the oft-stated rule that in a diversity case "state law controls
as to the substantive elements of the plaintiff's case and of defendant's
defense, but the sufficiency of evidence to raise a question of fact for the
37
jury is controlled by federal law.'1
Following Erie, federal courts sitting in Florida resort, whenever so
directed by Florida conflict rules, to Florida substantive law. In a tort
case, for example, a federal court has applied the Florida rule that the
burden of proof is on the defendant in cases where damage has resulted
from two causes, one of which involved vis major.18 They have also fol128. Id.
129. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108 (1945).
130. Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Cooperative, Inc., 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
131. Id.
132. 376 F.2d 397 (5th Cir. 1967).
133. Id. at 399.
134. 374 F.2d 455 (5th Cir. 1967). Cf. Liberty Leasing Co. v. Hillsum Sales Corp., 380
F.2d 1013 (5th Cir. 1967); Marshall v. Mintz, 386 F.2d 415 (5th Cir. 1967).
135. ABC-Paramount Records, Inc. v. Topps Record Distrib. Co., 374 F.2d 455, 459
(5th Cir. 1967).
136. Id. at 460.
137. Id. Relying on Sperry Rand Corp., v. Industrial Supply Corp., 337 F.2d 363 (5th
Cir. 1964), Survey II, at 528, the same court in Freeman v. Continental Gin Co., 381 F.2d
459 (5th Cir. 1967) held that a federal court in diversity must apply the parol evidence
rule as a state court would. In regard to characterization as substantive or procedural, see
Maryland Cas. Co. v. Williams, 377 F.2d 389 (5th Cir. 1967).
138. Parker v. Wideman, 380 F.2d 433 (5th Cir. 1967). Cf. Alford v. Blake, 385 F.2d
1010 (5th Cir. 1967) (doctrine of sudden emergency); Florida Power & Light Co. v. Hercules Concrete Pile Co., 275 F. Supp. 427 (S.D. Fla. 1967) (active-passive tort-feasor
doctrine).
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lowed the Florida law in regard to punitive damages in defamation
suits;'3 9 in actions based on Florida's Wrongful Death Statute; 140 in
suits on the right to use a trade name based on Florida's Fair Trade
Law;' 4 ' in contract matters regarding the enforcement of a price fight
agreement 42 and the requirements of mutual consent; 143 the principles of
agency;'4 and in a large number of cases involving insurance contracts. 45
However, it was held in Jacksonville Terminal v. Florida East Coast
Ry. 46 that federal and not state law controlled the question of whether
or not the president and general counsel of the company were properly
discharged under a contract approved by the Interstate Commerce Commission.
B. Abstention
The doctrine of abstention,147 closely related to Erie situations, is
one of the alternatives open to federal courts when faced with difficulties
139. Diplomat Elec., Inc. v. Westinghouse Elec. Supply Co., 378 F.2d 377 (5th Cir.
1967). Cf. Fox v. City of West Palm Beach, 383 F.2d 189 (5th Cir. 1967) (not recoverable against a municipality).
140. Win. G. Roe & Co. v. Armour & Co., 370 F.2d 829 (5th Cir. 1967) (damages
resulting from flourine gas emission); Marsden v. Patane, 380 F.2d 489 (5th Cir. 1967)
(traffic violation rebuttable presumption of negligence); Hamilton v. Armstrong Cork Co.,
371 F.2d 139 (5th Cir. 1967) (liability for break of pole) ; Olin's Tire Serv., Inc. v. United
States Rubber Co., 382 F.2d 852 (5th Cir. 1967) (loss of profits).
141. Miami Parts & Spring, Inc. v. Champion Spark Plug Co., 364 F.2d 957 (5th Cir.
1966); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Metropolitan Ins. Premium Fin. Corp., 264 F. Supp.
507 (S.D. Fla. 1966) (deceptive use of similar name); Gant of New Haven, Inc. v. Chez
Boye Parfums International, Inc., 256 F. Supp. 982 (M.D. Fla. 1966); Mead Johnson &
Co. v. Baby's Formula Serv., Inc., 270 F. Supp. 607 (S.D. Fla. 1967) (appropriation
of trade name). Cf. Tursair Executive Aircraft Servs., Inc. v. United States, 383 F.2d 381
(5th Cir. 1967) (trade usage in Florida).
142. Inter-Continental Promotions, Inc. v. MacDonald, 367 F.2d 293 (5th Cir. 1966).
Cf. Barzda v. Quality Courts Motel, Inc., 386 F.2d 417 (5th Cir. 1967) (third-party beneficiaries).
143. O'Neill v. Corp. Trustees, Inc., 376 F.2d 818 (5th Cir. 1967) ; Brunswick Corp. v.
Vineberg, 370 F.2d 605 (5th Cir. 1967) (breach of contract and inducing it) ; L & A Contracting Co. v. Oxley, 261 F. Supp. 469 (N.D. Okla. 1966) [interpretation of contract
under Florida law according to 15 OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 162 (1961)).
144. Duke v. Heppleston, 258 F. Supp. 313 (S.D. Fla. 1966); Exhibition Display
Serv. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 378 F.2d 903 (5th Cir. 1967) (passing of title in sale).
145. Bershire Mut. Ins. Co. v. Moffett, 378 F.2d 1007 (5th Cir. 1967) (evidence of
value); Hamilton v. Maryland Cas. Co., 368 F.2d 768 (5th Cir. 1966) (non-owned automobile); American Sur. Co. v. Coblentz, 381 F.2d 185 (5th Cir. 1967) (negligence or
assault and battery); Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Reichard, 262 F. Supp. 275 (S.D.
Fla. 1966) (assault); Sykes v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 269 F. Supp. 229 (S.D. Fla. 1967)
(death of minor); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Main, 383 F.2d 952 (5th Cir. 1967) (external cause); Glens Falls Ins. Co. v. Gray, 386 F.2d 520 (5th Cir. 1967) (ambiguous
condition in policy); Commercial Union Inc. Co. v. Reichard, 273 F. Supp. 952 (S.D. Fla.
1967) (actual and vicarious tortfeasor) ; Gordon v. American Motorists Co., 274 F. Supp.
592 (M.D. Fla. 1967) (preexisting physical condition).
146. 363 F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1966). But Florida law controls liabilities of directors of
dissolved corporation, Gould v. Brick, 258 F.2d 437 (5th Cir. 1966).
147. Described in Sun Ins. Office, Ltd. v. Clay, 319 F.2d 505, 508 (5th .Cir. 1963) as
a remitting of the parties in a pending federal court action to a state court for a
decision of a question of state law with a determination of the other issues by the
federal court; or upon election of the party remitted to the state court, for a complete and final adjudication by that court of the entire controversy.
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in ascertaining the applicable state law. The number of abstention cases
14 8
involving Florida law is undoubtedly affected by the Florida statute
providing for certification of "questions or propositions of the law of
this state, which are determinative of said cause," provided there are "no
clear controlling precedents in the decisions of the supreme court of this
state." In such cases the Supreme Court of Florida may answer requests
for "instructions concerning such questions or propositions of state law"
by written opinions. It is to be kept in mind that this statutory function
is limited to cases where the particular question of Florida Law is determinative of the case and there are no "controlling precedents in the decisions" of the supreme court. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Florida
has three alternatives for denying to act on such certifications. It may find
that the particular rule of law certified for declaration is not determinative
of the case and on this ground not give an opinion. Or it may deny certification on the ground that the supreme court has already ruled on the
question of law. However, the fact that intermediate or trial courts have
ruled on this point, appears not to be ground for such denial. The third
alternative is that there may be no state law in point to be declared since
the supreme court lacks power to create new law in certification proceedings.
Whether or not such opinions are binding upon federal courts' 4 9 will
not be discussed here. It is clear, however, that in matters involving a
federal constitutional question, federal courts have declined,1 50 in unmistakable terms, to accept such answers as binding. Additional doubts
may arise from general constitutional considerations based on the principle of separation of powers, or from the lack of constitutional grant
of power to a particular state supreme court.' To show the problem in
148. FLA. STAT. § 25.031 (1965). Kaplan, Certification Of Questions From Federal Appellate Courts To The Florida Supreme Court And Its Impact On The Abstention Doctrine, 16 U. MIAMI L. REV. 413 (1962).
149. This effect was seriously questioned in Sun Ins. Office, Ltd. v. Clay, 319 F.2d 505,
508 (5th Cir. 1963) where the court declined the imputation that by ordering certification
the Supreme Court also intended to declare such opinion to be binding, adding that the
Florida statute
does not require nor, we think, does it contemplate that parties in the federal litigation shall submit themselves to the jurisdiction of the state court . . . . The power
of the federal court to make a determination of the litigable issues between the
parties to the pending cause was neither transferred to nor shared with the state
court. The Supreme Court of Florida has, it seems, original jurisdiction only in
the issuance of extraordinary writs.
In this respect the authority relied upon by the Florida supreme court supporting its lawdeclaratory power seems to be a passage from 1 J. ANDREWS, AMERICAN LAW 221 (2d ed.
1908) and a number of Florida cases cited for the proposition that judicial powers vested
by the state constitution may be enlarged by the legislature, Sun Ins. Office, Ltd. v. Clay,
133 So.2d 735, 742 (Fla. 1961).
150. E.g., Sun Ins. Office, Ltd. v. Clay, 319 F.2d 505, 510 (5th Cir. 1963). See generally Note, Federal-Question Abstention: Justice Frankfurter's Doctrine in an Activist Era, 80
HARV. L. REV. 604 (1967).
151. E.g., United Serv. Life Ins. Co. v. Delaney, - Tex. - , 396 S.W.2d 855 (1965).
In Douglas Oil Co. v. State, 81 S.W.2d 1064 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935) the court saw the
essential difference between the declaratory judgment and the purely advisory
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better perspective, it may suffice to compare the solutions available in
jurisdictions without a statutory certification procedure. There parties
may be requested by the federal courts to litigate the point of state law
in regular proceedings in the appropriate state courts in order to recover,
in most cases, a declaratory judgment 52 which not only constitutes a
proper precedent but, at the same time, becomes res judicata between the
litigants and entitled in federal courts to full faith and credit."
Generally, federal courts consider themselves authorized as well as
qualified to ascertain and apply state law, even though, in particular situations, for reasons of "federalism, comity and convenience"' 1 4 they may
postpone their final adjudication. However, in situations not involving
constitutional issues or state administrative actions, federal courts appear
ready to ascertain state law even if there are no state precedents on point
by taking into account "not merely the generalizations and dicta in cases
from the past but also trends in modern legal thought."' 55 Since they have
opinion . . . in the fact that the former is a binding adjudication of the contested
rights of the litigants, though unaccompanied by consequential relief: whereas, the
latter is merely an opinion of the judges of the court, adjudicating nothing, and is
binding on no one. The former is held to be the exercise of a strictly judicial function; the latter that of a wholly non or extra judicial function.
Id. at 1077.
152. E.g., In re Richards, - Me. -, 223 A.2d 827 (1966), held state courts' participation in a certification procedure a "valid exercise of judicial power," Id. at 832, following Florida's Sun Ins. Office, Ltd. v. Clay, 319 F.2d 505 (5th Cir. 1963), but declined to
give advisory opinion because the crucial facts were not established by the requesting
federal district court; this prevented the state court from determining whether or not
the statement of state law would be "determinative of the cause," as required by the
controlling statute. Cf. Leiter Minerals, Inc. v. California 'Co., 241 La. 915, 132 So.2d 845
(1961) (directive from the Supreme Court to the Louisiana supreme court to render an
advisory opinion in the form of a declaratory judgment).
153. Delays caused by certification proceedings are dramatically revealed in the United
Servs. Life Ins. Co. v. Delaney litigation. After the insured died in 1959, the beneficiary's
claim was granted by a federal court in 1961 and affirmed on appeal, 308 F.2d (5th Cir.
1962) ; after rehearing on the point of abstention, 328 F.2d 483 (5th Cir. 1964), and after
certiorari was denied, 377 U.S. 935 (1964), motion for rehearing was granted, 358 F.2d 714
(1966), and certiorari denied 385 U.S. 846 (1966), the Texas courts were called upon to
declare the state law regarding interpretation of the insurance policy. However, the demand
was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, first by the trial, then by the appellate court, 386
S.W.2d 648 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965) and finally by the Texas supreme court, - Tex. - ,
396 S.W.2d 855 (1966). Thus the federal judiciary finds itself exactly where it started in
1961, and the widow is now waiting for some kind of decision for almost ten years.
Agata, Delaney, Diversity, and Delay: Abstention or Abdication? 4 HOUSTON L. REV. 422
(1966).
Generally, note the dissenting opinion in W.S. Ranch Comp. v. Kaiser Steel Corp.,
388 F.2d 257, 263 (10th Cir. 1968).
154. United States v. Shock, 379 F.2d 29, 31 (8th Cir. 1967). In favor of state courts
as the "final expositors of state law," England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411 (1964), and recently DuVall v. Moore, 276 F. Supp. 689 (N.D. Iowa
1967).
155. Graves v. Associated Transp., Inc., 344 F.2d 894, 896 (4th Cir. 1965) ; State v.
Capital Airlines, 267 F. Supp. 298, 303 (D. Md. 1967). In Hill v. United States Fid. &
Guar. Co., 272 F. Supp. 569 (M.D. Fla. 1967) the court assumed, in absence of any Florida
cases in point that the Supreme Court of Florida "would probably follow the well reasoned
opinion" of the appellate court of Illinois in Nelson v. Union Wire Rope Corp., 39 Ill.

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. XXII

jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter, they apply, according
to the Rule of Decision, state law as they find it. However, this relatively
simple method of law finding may, as already indicated, be abandoned in favor of the expensive, time-consuming, 15 6 and complex procedure of certification. This was done by the Supreme Court in regard to
Florida law in the Clay 5 7 and Aldrich 5 8 cases, but not in Hanson v.
Denkla.'5 9 In some cases, however, federal appellate courts take advantage of certification, following the majority rule in United Services Life
Insurance Company v. Delaney.6 0 In Life Insurance Company v. Shifflet, 6' for example, the motion to certify the interpretation of section
627.01081 of the Florida Statutes was granted in view of the different
positions taken by the federal courts of appeals and a Florida district
court of appeal. In Hopkins v. Lockheed Aircraft Corporation.2 the federal court of appeals wanted to know if Florida followed the Kilberg
doctrine, and certified the question to the Supreme Court of Florida even
though a summary perusal of recent Florida cases would have given a
simple answer in the negative. It is significant that the question was
phrased conditionally: what rule would the courts of Florida apply in
such a case? The Supreme Court of Florida gave an equally conditional6 answer which was a "forecast rather than a determination,"' 6 4
and reversed on rehearing. 65
There is a growing number of cases where federal courts decline
certification and take upon themselves to ascertain Florida law in the
same manner as Florida state courts, with no similar alternative of certification to ascertain federal law. In Hamilton v. Maryland Casualty Company' 66 the judge dissenting in Delaney 67 had his way and prevented
abstention in a case involving the interpretation of a Florida insurance
policy, writing as follows:
App. 2d 73, 187 N.E.2d 425 (1963) involving personal injuries which occurred in Florida.
Faced with the state law problem of products liability, the court in Helene Curtis Ind., Inc.
v. Pruitt, 385 F.2d 841 (5th Cir. 1968), decided to consider "all the available data, including the restatements of law, treatises, law review commentary, and the majority rule.
Hopefully, our Erie prediction will be indicative of what Oklahoma will do in the future
and will not be easily erased." Id. at 848.
156. See note 146, supra.
157. Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 277 U.S. 179 (1964) ; see Survey I, at 273, and Survey II, at 497.
158. Aldrich v. Aldrich, 375 U.S. 249 (1963) ; see Survey II, at 516.
159. 357 U.S. 235, 262 (1958).
160. 328 F.2d 483 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 935 (1964).
161. 380 F.2d 375 (5th Cir. 1967). The rule in Life Ins. Co. v. Shiffiet, 201 So.2d 715
(1967) was followed in McDonell v. New England Mut. Life Ins. Co., 380 F.2d 983 (5th
Cir. 1967).
162. 358 F.2d 347 (5th Cir. 1966).
163. Hopkins v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 201 So.2d 743 (Fla. 1967).
164. Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman, 312 U.S. 496, 499 (1941).
165. Hopkins v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 201 So.2d 749 (Fla. 1967).
166. 368 F.2d 768 (Sth Cir. 1966).

1968]

CONFLICT OF LAWS

Another of that ever-growing list of intramural insurance Donnybrooks which, as local disputes over the local reading of a
local contract with no federal overtones, constitutional, statutory, or otherwise, could better be left to local courts to resolve,
it seems the better part of judicial wisdom to bring this to an
end without postponing the evil day of decision. . . .Helpful
as is the Florida Supreme Court reference procedure, especially
in areas which present alternative governmental or social policy
choices even though ostensibly garbed in the austere form of an
insurance policy, we think the question here is the simple one
whether the insurance contract says what it means and means
what it says.168
The same attitude prevailed in a number of subsequent insurance cases.
In Greerv. Associated Indemnity Corporation'6 9 the court, observing that
"insurers flee from state forums to litigate their local, nonfederal claims
in the Federal Courts," declined to abstain saying:
Indeed, we can think of no more local an Erie-problem than construction of the provisions of an insurance contract, a judicial
process in which public policy factors frequently assume ex-.
traordinary importance, so much so as to produce diametrically
opposite judicial constructions of uniform policy clauses ....
Pointing as such considerations do toward utilizing-as we have
done often in the past-the salutary provisions for certification
to the Florida Supreme Court, we think such circuity unnecessary and, hence, inadvisable here. There is simply no room for
doubt as to the required result. We read
the Erie signal loud and
70
clear with no need for amplification.1
Again, in Motor Vehicle Casualty Company v. Atlantic National Insurance Company17 ' the interpretation of an insurance policy was at issue.
In the words of the judge, the question was "who picks up the pieces under Florida contract law between parties who never knew each other or
for all that appears, never wanted to have anything to do with each
other.' 72 Such "intra-mural dispute" between two insurers "one of whom
puts on the appealing garb of an animate assured . . .to force on its
brother underwriter a liberal construction of a kind he would normally
repel," was found "neither intricate nor repetitive enough to warrant a
Clay-type referral to the Supreme Court of Florida.' 73 And again, in
Liberty National Life v. Dobson'74 the federal court of appeals, after finding that there were no Florida appellate cases in point and "each of the
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

United Serv. Life Ins. Co. v. Delaney, 328 F.2d 483 (5th Cir. 1964).
Hamilton v. Maryland Cas. Co., 368 F.2d 768, 769 (5th Cir. 1966).
371 F.2d 29 (5th Cir. 1967).
Id. at 30.
374 F.2d 601 (5th Cir. 1967).
Id.at 602.
Id. at 602.
377 F.2d 861 (5th Cir. 1967).
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conflicting views is plausible," took it upon itself to determine what
"Florida appellate courts would
hold," in the "hope that our guess will be
17 5
enlightened and inspired.'
V.

CHOICE-OF-LAW

RULES

The trend of loosening the traditional conflict methods and dissolving
the one-contact rules into general standards of reasonableness, significance
or interests, has reached Florida in the colorless formulas of "reasonable"
and "significant relations" espoused by the Uniform Commercial Code. 76
Neither of these standards, alone or in conjunction, is easy to apply or to
predict. Lack of enthusiasm for these novel rules has been expressed recently as follows:
The cardinal virtue of the traditional rule was its certainty, ease
of application, and predictability. Departure from that rule,
where it has been departed from-largely due to the labour and
prolific writing of legal scholars-has7 left a different problem of
formulating a rule to take its place.1

It is clear to some courts that our mass society is more interested in certainty of the law than in refinements urged by well intentioned addicts of
legal l'art-pour-l'art.The layman enmeshed in the unpredictable intricacies of such schemes suspects, and with reason, that in matters of contracts these uncertainties will only increase the length and expense of
litigation as well as the complexity of the fine print in the adhesion contracts which he cannot avoid or change. 78 The same apprehension is
understandable in tort actions which, for the most part, are litigated as
insurance claims. Here too, the risk of different adjudications will force
insurers to run for cover under additional fine print in policies and increased insurance rates because of ill defined legal standards actuarily
unpredictable. One means of remedying the unwanted side-effects of the
new wave engulfing traffic accidents is a federal statute fashioned after
the Death on High Seas Act and covering injuries and deaths
arising from
17 9
all modes of interstate and international transportation.
175. Id. at 864. For two recent opinions by the Supreme Court dealing with abstention,
see Zwickler v. Koota, 88 S. Ct. 391 (1967), and Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co.
v. Patterson, 88 S. Ct. 733, 746 (1968).
176. See Survey II, at 498.
177. Casey v. Manson Constr. & Eng'r Co., - Ore. , , 428 P.2d 898, 899
(1967). But see Watts v. Pioneer Corn Co., 342 F.2d 617 (7th Cir. 1965), and Karczewski v.
Baltimore & 0. R.R., 274 F. Supp. 169 (N.D. Ill. 1967).
178. A. EHRENZWEIO, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 454 (1962). See generally
Note, Predictability versus Flexibility: the Conflict in Conflict of Laws, 18 W. RES. L. REV.
938 (1967).
179. For recent developments in international transportation of persons, see note 318
infra. Two bills (S. 3305 and S. 3306) have been introduced (April 1968) in Congress by
Senator Tydings to confer exclusive jurisdiction arising from passenger claims in interstate
and international air transportation on federal courts and to enact a federal statute unifying
matters covered by wrongful death and survival statutes.
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A. Torts
In a minority of jurisdictions the traditional scope of the lex loci
delicti has recently been modified in regard to the amount of damages
arising out of aviation accidents and in regard to some aspects of liability
in automobile accidents in foreign jurisdictions. In air transportation it is
felt that the place of the crash may be allowed to provide the basis for
liability of the carrier, but should not limit the amount recoverable whenever the lex fori has no limitation and in addition displays other contacts
with the parties which are considered more significant than the fortuitous
place of the accident. This innovation has been adopted in the Kilberg
case,'80 first in New York and subsequently followed in some other jurisdictions. Even though constitutionally unobjectionable, 8" it was rejected
in a number of jurisdictions where the innovation resulted only in a
strengthening of the traditional lex loci delicti rule. 82 The other qualification grafted onto the lex loci delicti rule involves intra-vehicular liability
claims between occupants in non-commercial automobile transportation.
These relationships have been taken out of the scope of the lex loci delicti
and made subject to the lex fori. This leaves extra-vehicular aspects of the
same tort (e.g., the rule of the road, liability for injuries to persons and
things outside the vehicle) subject to the untrammeled reign of the traditional lex loci rule. Intra-vehicular relationships, whenever decisive in
such situations, may be of a twofold nature: those based on the family
status (e.g., marital relationship) affecting the right to sue; or those based
on a recently created status, that of guest passenger'8 who may
claim only under special conditions. The determination of these relationships as well as their effect on the tort claim has been isolated in some
jurisdictions from the lex loci and subjected to the lex fori; provided,
however, that the application of the forum's law is supported by additional meaningful contacts. This, in substance, was the holding of the
Babcock case 8 4 while marital and other family relationships had been disassociated from the lex loci delicti much earlier.
180. Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211 N.Y.S.2d
133 (1961). For recent developments, see Gore v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 373 F.2d 717 (2d
Cir. 1967).
181. Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 309 F.2d 553 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372
U.S. 912 (1963).
182. E.g., Marmon v. Mustang Aviation, Inc., 416 S.W.2d 58 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
Moreland, Conflict of Laws: Choice of Law in Tort Cases, A Critique, 56 Ky. L.J. 5 (1967).
183. Ehrenzweig, Foreign Guest Statutes and Forum Accidents: Against the Disperanto
of State 'Interests', 68 COLUm. L. REV. 49 (1968).
184. Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963);
followed recently in Clark v. Clark, 107 N.H. 351, 222 A.2d 205 (1966), and Mellk v.
Meilk, 49 N.J. 226, 229 A.2d 625 (1967). Baer, Two Approaches to Guest Statutes in the
Conflict of Laws: Mechanical Jurisprudence versus Groping for Contacts, 16 BurAo L.
REv. 537 (1967).
Plaintiff's attempt to attack the lex loci delicti rule in a guest statute litigation on constitutional grounds, urging the rule in Alexander v. Alexander, 140 F. Supp. 925 (D.S.C.
1956), Survey I, at 298, was unsuccessful in Locklair v. Locklair, 256 F. Supp. 530 (D.S.C.
1966). Cf. Bencomo v. Bencomo, 200 So.2d 171 (Fla. 1967). See generally Note, Litigation be-
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The Kilberg doctrine came before the Supreme Court of Florida
through certification from a federal court of appeals 8 ' asking the following question:
Would the State Courts of Florida, for reasons of public policy
or otherwise, refuse to apply the Illinois limitation of damages in
the above
situation, and if so, would any limitation of damages
186
apply.
The case was against a manufacturer and arose out of an airplane crash
in Illinois. Plaintiff's deceased, a Florida resident, was a passenger on the
last leg of a round trip from Milwaukee to Tampa on a ticket purchased
in Tampa where the flight originated. The limited amount of damages
available under Illinois law as the lex loci delicti had already been paid by
the air carrier.
Tempted by the plaintiff counsel's suggestion that the Supreme
Court 8 7 here "has an opportunity to align itself with those courts which
have discarded the ancient rule that the lex loci delicti is the sole arbiter
of the substantive rights and liabilities of the parties in tort cases,"' 8 8 it
accepted the belief that the decisions following the Kilberg doctrine are
"based on impeccable and irresistible logic and reasoning."' 89 The court
noted that the lex loci delicti rule has "over the years lost much if not all
of its authenticity,"' 90 citing an Ohio case for that proposition. The court
saw in the Babcock'' case authority to refute the "conceptual foundation
in the vested rights doctrine," in favor of "underlying policy considerations in evaluating the significance to be ascribed to the circumstance that
an act had a foreign situs in determining the rights and liabilities which
arise out of that act."' 9' Turning to the "frequently announced and
strongly worded policy of this forum to give primary consideration, in
choice-of-laws cases, to the public policy-legislative as well as organicor 'any salutary interest' in this state and to decline to enforce a foreign
law when contrary thereto,"' 93 the court aligned itself with the Kilberg
doctrine, adding the following:
It is clear that we can, consistently with our application of the
judicial principle of comity in choice-of-law cases and without
doing any real violence to the principle of stare decisis, take the
one small logical step forward and hold squarely, as did the New
tween Husband and Wife, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1650 (1966); Comment, Tort Liability between
Husband and Wife, 21 U. MIAmi L. REv. 423 (1966).

185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.

Hopkins v. Lockheed
Id. at 349.
Hopkins v. Lockheed
Id. at 745.
Id.
Id.
Babcock v. Jackson,
Hopkins v. Lockheed
Id. at 747.

Aircraft Corp., 358 F.2d 347 (5th Cir. 1966).
Aircraft Corp., 201 So.2d 743 (Fla. 1967).

12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963).
Aircraft Corp., 201 So.2d 743, 746 (1967).
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York court in Babcock v. Jackson . . . , that the strict lex loci
delicti rule should be abandoned in favor of a more flexible rule
which permits analysis of the policies
and interests underlying
9
the particular issue before the court.' '
In so doing the court not only overlooked the language of Florida's own
Wrongful Death Statute, allowing unlimited recovery only for claims
arising in Florida,'9 5 but brushed aside any serious consideration of the
passenger-manufacturer warranty relationship, which distinguishes this
case from Kilberg. In conclusion the court stated that the "purely fortuitous circumstance that the plane happened to crash in Illinois does not
give that state a controlling interest or concern in the amount to be
awarded to a Florida resident, by a Florida court, from a California de' and held that
fendant,"196
the State" 7 of Florida "would refuse to apply
the Illinois limitation of damages in the circumstances of this case."
Florida would have adopted the Kilberg doctrine through the certification procedure but for a rehearing which resulted in the repudiation
9
of the doctrine and the return to the traditional rule of lex loci delicti. 8
Beginning with the proposition that damages claimed are of statutory
origin and unavailable without the non-severable limitation contained
therein, the court reached the conclusion that the action "survives the
death of the party only by virtue of statutory preservation under the law
of the state where death occurred, in Illinois."' 9 Since the court was unable to "find such overriding collision with public policy simply because
the statute governing action for death occurring in this state contains no
damage limitation,"200 and the action was one based on warranty, the
court held that:
To the extent, however, that the place of performance or breach
of warranty may control the action, the law of Illinois should
govern in this case, and there are obvious virtues, in consistency
and stability, supporting the application of laws whenever possible in a cohesive rather than piecemeal fashion. In other
words, the applicability or inapplicability of foreign law should
so far as possible be based on objective and stable standards.
While the place at which an event occurs may indeed be fortuitous, that circumstance nevertheless seems to me of primary
importance in determining the legal effect to be accorded any
occurrence upon which a cause of action depends. A domiciliary
194. Id.
195. FLA. STAT. § 768.01(1) (1965).
196. Hopkins v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 201 So.2d 743, 748 (Fla. 1967).
197. The question reads "Would the State Courts of Florida . . . ," but was answered
what "the State of Florida" would do.
198. Hopkins v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 201 So.2d 743, 749 (Fla. 1967).
199. Id. at 751.
200 Id.
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or other forum in which a transitory action is brought may in
these times be equally fortuitous. 2"'
The 1967 Florida Legislature adopted the Uniform Single Publication Act,20 2 substituting for "one cause of action" the phrase "one choice
of venue, 20 3 an amendment representing no improvement. Thus, the
modified version reads:
No person shall have more than one choice of venue for damages
for libel or slander or invasion of privacy or any other tort
founded upon any single publication or exhibition or utterance,
such as any one edition of a newspaper or book or magazine or
any presentation to an audience or any one broadcast over radio
or television or any one exhibition of a motion picture. Recovery
in any action shall include all damages for any such tort suffered
by the plaintiff in all jurisdictions.20 4
Consequently, a judgment recovered in any jurisdiction shall "bar any
other action for damages by the same plaintiff against the same defendant
founded on the same publication or exhibition or utterance.1 20

5

For good

measure, section 4 adds that:
No person shall have more than one choice of venue for damages
for libel founded upon a single publication or exhibition or utterance, as described in section 1, and upon his election in any one
of his choices of venue, then he shall be bound to recover there
all damages allowed him.
B.

Contracts

As sketched in a recent Supreme Court dissent:
There was a time in the evolution of conflict of laws theories
when the idea was championed that every detail and element of
a contract, every action taken under it, was governed by the law
of the place where the contract was made. This concept ran into
201. Id. Followed in Messinger v. Tom, 203 So.2d 357 (2d Dist. 1967), holding that
minor plaintiff had no cause of action for death of mother in North Carolina, on the
ground urged by defendant that by the
law of lex loci, North Carolina, the minor child had no cause of action [since]
the law of North Carolina which . . . provides that a wrongful death action may
be maintained only by a representative of the decedent's estate, governed the action,
despite the overwhelming contacts with the State of Florida and the salutary
interest of this state underlying the particular issue before the trial court.
Id. at 358. CI. Brooks v. United States, 273 F. Supp. 619 (D.S.C. 1967).
202. For venue cases, see Firstamerica Dcv. Corp. v. Daytona Beach News-journal
Corp., 196 So.2d 97 (Fla. 1966), and Drummond v. Tribune Co., 193 So.2d 183 (Fla. ist
Dist. 1966). See generally Insull v. New York World Telegram Corp., 172 F. Supp. 615
(Ill. 1959), aff'd, 273 F.2d 166 (7th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 942 (1960) ; Buckley
v. New York Post Corp., 373 F.2d 175 (2d Cir. 1967).
203. Cf. UNIFORM SINGLE PUBLICATION ACT (1952 version); Ogden v. Association of
the U.S. Army, 177 F. Supp. 498 (D.D.C. 1959).
204. FLA. STAT. § 770.05 (1967).
205. Id.
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many difficulties. Was the contract made at the home office of
an insurance company or at the place where an agent dropped it
in the mail to send it to a man in another State? Exceptions
sprang up such as the rule applying the law of the place where
the contract was to be performed to issues of performance. Soon
it was discovered that it was almost as puzzling to tell where a
contract was intended to be performed or what part of activities
under a contract could be considered performance as it had been
to determine where a contract was made. These and other such
academic problems dissipated the dream of a fixed rule or rules
for deciding which law governed contract cases. As the concepts
developed, there came an emphasis upon having a contract governed by the law which the parties intended to be applied. But it
was not always possible to tell which law the parties had agreed
upon, and there was resistance on the part of some jurisdictions
having close interests in the events leading to litigation to applying foreign law, against their deeply felt policies, solely because
the parties at one time preferred it. As business boomed throughout our growing country giving more States than one an interest
in what a contract meant and how it should be enforced for the
benefit of the citizens who made it or for whose benefit it was
made, practical men began to see that there could not be one
single rule of law to govern 20a contract in which the citizens of
many States were interested.

Solutions available both for interstate and international choice-oflaw situations are twofold: to spell out operative contacts and list them
as guidelines, or to adopt general, abstract standards and let parties and
courts take care of their concretization. The former alternative was
chosen in the Restatement20 7 while the latter alternative of "reasonable"
and "appropriate relation" adopted in the Uniform Commercial Code became, in 1967, within the scope of the Code, Florida's statutory rule.2" 8
However, there are no reported Florida cases in this area.
As an aftermath of numerous and extensive litigations involving
enforcement in Florida of Cuban insurance contracts, °9 a number of
cases remained to be finally adjudicated. It may be noted that, as these
numerous cases progressed, additional factors came into play, among them
the final decision in the Sabbatino case210 with its congressional modifica" ' and the fact that Cuba withdrew
tion,21
from the International Monetary
206. Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 363 U.S. 207, 217 (1960).
207. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 332(b) (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1961).
Cf. Rutas Aereas Nacionales, S.A. v. Robinson, 339 F.2d 265 (5th Cir. 1964); Survey II,

at 528.
208. See Survey II, at 498.
209. Comment, International Law: Insurance Claims on Policies of Cuban Nationals,
18 U. MiAi L. REV. 454 (1963).
210. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964); Grove, International
Law, Conflict Law and Sabbatino, 19 U. MiAmI L. REV. 216 (1964).
211. 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e) (2) (1964); cf. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, 383 F.2d
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Fund. It is also gratifying that courts have started considering the Bretton Woods Agreement2 12 more carefully.
In a group of cases218 the federal court of appeals ruled that the
seizure of assets of an insurance company by the Castro government did
not of itself affect the rights of the insured to enforce their contractual
claims in accordance with the stipulated place and currency of payment.
In regard to currency in which insurance payments shall be made, it was
held that amounts agreed in Cuban pesos but payable in this country shall
be paid in dollars at the prevailing rate of exchange here. Similarly, life
insurance policies originally issued in the United States with premiums
and benefits payable in dollars in Louisiana should be paid in the same
currency regardless of the fact that they have been later changed to
Cuban pesos.21 4
This position has also been taken by Florida courts.2 1" They have
held that a Cuban refugee residing in Florida will recover the cash value
of an insurance policy issued in Havana in the legal currency of Cuba,
i.e., pesos, in American dollars at the market value of pesos at the time of
demand rather than at the rate of one American dollar for one Cuban
216

peso.

Hebrew law was recently urged by the plaintiff, an "internationally
renowned opera singer and equally renowned cantor," as determinative of
his contract with a Miami Beach hotel.21 7 His contract contained an express provision that if a "second Seder service to be held, same price as
first night." The hotel cancelled a second service despite the plaintiff's
understanding that according to prevailing religious custom there are
always two Sedars. The court acknowledged that a different conclusion
may have been reached "were the issues herein decided on religious or
moral grounds," but under the applicable "legal principles and not by
religious, moral or ethical considerations alone,121 1 it affirmed dismissal of
166 (2d Cir. 1967) cert. denied,-U.S.-(1968), 88 S. Ct. 1038 (1968); Banco Nacional de
Cuba v. First Nat'l City Bank, 270 F. Supp. 1004 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
212. 60 Stat. 1401 (1945), T.I.A.S. No. 1501. J. GOLD, THE CUBAN INSURANCE CASES
AND
HE ARTICLES OF THE FUND (1966) ; Bayitch, Florida and International Legal Developments, 1962-1963, 18 U. MIAmi L. REV. 321, 349 (1963) ; Paradise, Cuban Refugee Insureds
and the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, 18 U. FLA. L. REV. 29
(1965).
213. Alvarez v. Pan American Life Ins. Co., 375 F.2d 992 (5th Cir. 1967).
214. Pan American Life Ins. Co. v. Alvarez, 374 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1967).
215. American Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Cardenas, 181 So.2d 359 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965); Pan
American Life Ins. Co. v. Del Valle, 201 So.2d 610 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967) ; United States Ins.
Co. v. Alonso, 201 So.2d 577 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967).
216. Pan American Life Ins. Co. v. Blanco, 362 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1966). On the
definition of "area of United States of America" in an insurance policy, see Bolen Int'l, Inc.
v. Medow, 191 So.2d 51 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966); cf. United States Lines Co. v. Eastburn
Marine Chem. Co., 221 F. Supp. 881 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
217. Tucker v. Forty-Five Twenty-Five, Inc., 199 So.2d 522 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967).
218. Id. at 525.
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the action for breach of contract and tort, accepting the determination of
the lower court that there was no binding contract for a second Sedar.
An action for declaratory judgment to construe a contract not to
compete in the tomato produce market was before Florida courts in C. &
D. Farms, Inc. v. Cerniglia. The contract, nationwide in scope, was
entered into in Georgia and expressly subject to Georgia law. The appellate court21 held that the contract was valid-at least for the purposes of
its opinion-under the law of Georgia, but found it unreasonable and,
therefore, unenforceable in Florida, due to Florida's public policy against
contracts in restraint of trade.220 On certiorari, the supreme court in a per
curiam opinion... agreed with this holding on the ground that "if the performance in Florida of a foreign made contract is repugnant to our public
policy it is unenforceable here," adding that it is not "necessarily void or
'
voidable in other jurisdictions."222
By basing its decision only on the
ground of public policy, the court below sidestepped the plaintiff's argument that the lack of mutuality affected the very validity of the contract.
In this respect the supreme court took the position that the validity of the
"contract everywhere," as distinguished from its unenforceability due to
the forum's public policy, may be settled in Florida courts on the issue of
mutuality, on the ground that "if, under the applicable law, the contract
is found to be lacking in mutuality of obligation, the contract can be void
in its entirety and everywhere, ' 22 3 without indicating what such "applicable law" might be. By contrast, if the plaintiff "must rely on public
policy relating to such contracts, he will be required to litigate the unenforceable nature of the contract in each state covered therein. '224
It appears that the supreme court approached the complex choice-oflaw problem of a contract multistate in its performance, by first using the
distinction between validity and enforceability. On this basis, the court
agreed with the holding by the appellate court that the contract is valid
but unenforceable, at least in a Florida forum, adding the caveat that the
plaintiff would have to relitigate the issue of enforceability of the contract
in each jurisdiction where the contract applies. This position, however, is
patently erroneous since the question of the application vel non of the
public policy in force in another jurisdiction is not a jurisdictional but a
choice-of-law question, provided proper pleadings have imposed on the
court the duty to make a decision in this point of foreign law. In any
event, this issue could have been decided by a Florida court having jurisdiction over the parties in an in personam action to determine their con219. C. & D. Farms, Inc. v. Cerniglia, 189 So.2d 384 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
220. FLA. STAT. § 542.12 (1967).
221. Cerniglia v. C. & D. Farms, Inc., 203 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1967).

222. Id at 2. Cf. May v. Mulligan, 36 F. Supp. 596 (W.D. Mich. 1936), aff'd, 117 F.2d
259 (6th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 312 U.S. 691 (1941).

223. Cerniglia v. C. & D. Farms, Inc., 203 So.2d 1, 3 (Fla. 1967).
224. Id.

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. XXII

tractual relations wherever they may take effect, always in accordance
with the applicable laws, including public policy, controlling under the
conflict rules of the forum.
The appellate decision involving another aspect of the issue, however,
did not meet with approval on the part of the supreme court. The appellate determination limited to the enforceability of the contract in Florida
did not meet, in the opinion of the supreme court, the plaintiff's demand
that he was "entitled to a decision on the issue of mutuality of obligation." 5 In this respect, the court probably assumed that a decision based
on this common law doctrine would make the solution look as if it were
reached under a nationwide uniform substantive rule and, consequently,
effective "everywhere." This solution, however, lacks persuasiveness. Not
only does the doctrine vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, but it appears
from the opinions in the present case that there was not even an allegation
on the part of the plaintiff that the doctrine is, throughout the area covered
by the contract, identical with the law of the forum.
This is not the end of the difficulties. Once the reasonable chance has
been discarded to determine the validity of the contract by the law of
Georgia (chosen as controlling by the parties) which is, at the same time,
the law of the place of making as well as the law of the state "wherein
most of the corporate entities involved had their center of interest,"2" the
alternative to decide this question by the law of a single jurisdiction was
lost. If the mention by the supreme court of the "applicable law" regarding mutuality is to be taken as pointing toward the law applied by the
appellate court, namely the law of performance, then the validity of the
contract would have to be tested against the laws in force in all jurisdictions covered by the contract. But even in adopting this solution, it may
happen that, in turn, these jurisdictions may, in determining the controlling substantive law, rely on the law of the place of making or on the law
chosen by parties which, in this case, fortunately is the same.
This solution appears also to be the one agreed upon by the parties
themselves. They made the contract not only severable in regard to its
spacial extent but subjected it, thus severed, to the laws of the particular
jurisdictions, by providing that:
[E]ach area is divisible and separable so that in the event the
covenants not to compete shall be invalid or unenforceable in
any geographic area described, they shall be valid and enforceable in those geographic areas in which the same are valid and
enforceable by law, the intention of the parties being that the
companies be given the broadest protection allowed by law as
respects the covenants not to compete herein contained and
wherever necessary the areas which may be protected by law
225. Id.
226. C. & D. Farms, Inc. v. Cerniglia, 189 So.2d 384, 385 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
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may be determined and proved by facts and evidence. (Emphasis added).227

This, again, represents a choice of the applicable law by parties to the
contract which, as a rule, is to be given effect, 2 s particularly in view of
the fact that the laws so chosen have reasonable connections with the very
operation of the contract. Of course, the spectre of the fifty jurisdictions
lurking behind such piecemeal treatment of the contract seems more
menacing than ever.2
C.

Negotiable Instruments

A demand for contribution by a co-maker of negotiable instruments
was at issue in McMahon v. Weesner231 because of a judgment rendered
against the present plaintiff in Oklahoma.2"' There the court, finding that
the notes were executed in Haiti, made payable in Florida, and transferred to the plaintiff in Texas, held that:
The question whether a holder is a holder in due course is governed by the laws of the state where the note was transferred, or
of the forum, need not to be decided .... 232
and approved the application of Oklahoma law which it found to be
essentially the same as the law of Texas.
D. Property
1.

REAL PROPERTY

In a litigation 23 3 involving "a little bit of oceanography, a little bit of
marine biology, a little bit of tidelands oil controversy, a little bit of international law, a little bit of latter day Marco Polo exploration,

'234

the

court found itself facing the unimaginative procedural question of intervention, with coral reefs some ten miles off the coast of Florida providing
the background. Interests asserted by private individuals and corporations
based on discovery and occupation clashed with the position taken by the
federal government asserting in this area "sovereign's exclusive domain
and control" according to the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act of
1953.235 The demand by the government for an injunction raised three
227. Id.
228. Cf. Standard Register Co. v. Kerrigan, 238 S.C. 54, 119 S.E.2d 533 (1961).
229. Cf. National Fruit Prod. Co. v. Dwinell-Wright Co., 47 F. Supp. 499 (D. Mass.
1942); Davis v. Ebsco Indus., Inc., 150 So.2d 460 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963); see also 70 A.L.R.2d
1292.
230. 254 F. Supp. 839 (S.D. Fla. 1966).
231. Caribbean Mills, Inc. v. McMahon, 217 F. Supp. 639 (N.D. Okla. 1963), aff'd, 332
F.2d 641 (10th Cir. 1964).
232. McMahon v. Caribbean Mills, 332 F.2d 641, 644 (10th Cir. 1964).
233. Atlantis Dev. Corp. v. United States, 379 F.2d 818 (5th Cir. 1967).
234. Id. at 819.
"$. 43 US.S.C. 11331-1343 (1964). Cf. United States v. Florida, 363 U.S. 121 (1960).
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immediate issues: federal jurisdiction; the proof of the alleged trespass;
and the nature of the defendant's activities in the area of the reefs without a governmental permit. In this respect the federal court of appeals
identified the basic substantive questions underlying the controversy,
whether these coral reefs built by accretion of marine biology
are "submerged lands" under the Outer Continental Shelf Land
Act. .

.

.The second basic question is whether, assuming both

from the standpoint of geographical location and their nature
they constitute "lands," does the sovereignty of the United
States extend to them with respect to any purposes not included
in or done for the protection of the "exploring for, developing,
removing and transporting. . .

."

natural resources therefrom.236

The intervention was granted by the court and the deck was cleared for
alitigation and adjudication on the merits.
2. MOVABLES
The effect of a transfer of title to an automobile executed in Alabama
in accord with the lex loci actus as a notarized bill accompanied with
transfer of possession to a Florida dealer was at issue in General Finance
Corporation v. East Lake Auto Sales, Co.,23 7 decided under Florida law
prior to the 1965 amendment. 88 In the action for conversion brought by
the Alabama wholesaler, the district court of appeals held, on the authority of Trumbul Chevrolet Sales Co. v. Seawright,2- 9 that in view of evidence of ownership, i.e., the notarized bill of sale, handed over to the
Florida dealer coupled with the transfer of possession, the wholesaler was
estopped to claim superior title because under the provision of the bill of
sale the title remains in the wholesaler "until all checks clear the banks
and clearing houses .

. .

... As to the local buyers, the court relied on the

maxim that "where one of two innocent persons must suffer from the act
or negligence of a third, he who by his conduct created the' circumstances
°
which made the wrongful act possible, must bear the loss. 24
236. Atlantis Dev. Corp. v. United States, 379 F.2d 818, 826 (5th Cir. 1967). Cf. United
States v. Ray, 281 F. Supp. 876 (S.D. Fla. 1965) (injunction against dredging operations
in the area of outer continental shelf).
237. 190 So.2d 339 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1966).
238. See Survey II, at 532.
239. 134 So.2d 829 (Fla. 1st. Dist. 1961).
240. General Fin. Corp. v. East Lake Auto Sales Co., 190 So.2d 399, 403 (Fla. 1st
Dist. 1966). In regard to notice and liens of motorboats, FLA. STAT. § 371.81 (1967) provides
that "no liens for purchase money or as security for a debt in the form of retain title
contract, conditional bill of sale or chattel mortgage, or otherwise, on a motorboat" will be
enforceable "in any courts of this state against creditors or subsequent purchasers for a
valuable consideration and without notice unless a sworn notice of such lien is recorded."
However, there is no statutory rule dealing with foreign created security interests, unless
FLA. STAT. § 679.9-103 (1967) is deemed controlling. See Survey II, at 534.
Situs of intangible personal property is determined by the domicile of its owners; this
being Florida, a mortgage is a chose in action under Florida law, amenable to a creditor
and also to a federal tax lien, United States v. Cohen, 271 F. Supp. 709 (S.D. Fla. 1967).
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E. Family Law
1.

MARRIAGE

The recent Florida legislature decided 4' to deny validity to common
law marriages entered into after January 1, 1968. There is a saving clause
to the effect that "nothing contained in this act shall affect any marriage
which, though otherwise defective, was entered into, by the party asserting such marriage, in good faith and in substantial compliance with chapter 741, Florida Statutes." Without going into the meaning of "otherwise
defective" and the new requirement of "good faith" on the part of the
spouse "asserting such marriage," it suffices to point out that the new
enactment does not appear to be a statement of a public policy so strong
as to demand denial of recognition to common law marriages which are
valid under the law of the place of conclusion.
2.

DIVORCE JURISDICTION

Divorce jurisdiction over a husband who was personally served in
the state in an action for separate maintenance, which was subsequently
amended to include a prayer for divorce based upon the same grounds,
was litigated in Gilbert v. Gilbert.24 2 Notice given to the defendant's
attorney in the original suit was held sufficient even without additional
constructive service on the nonresident husband. The defendant's argument that the plaintiff had not satisfied the six months residence requirement "until immediately preceding the filing of the amended complaint,"
was dismissed by the court on the ground that
Length and character of residence do not affect jurisdiction over
the person but only jurisdiction over the subject matter. Section
65.02 . . . requires that the complainant reside six months in

Florida before filing a complaint for divorce. Unless the requirement is satisfied the court lacks jurisdiction over the subject
matter.243
Despite the defendant's allegation to the contrary, the court found that
the plaintiff had resided in the state for six months before filing the
amended complaints and concluded that2' 44
the court "had jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the divorce action.

In an Alabama divorce suit which was instituted but not prosecuted,
the defendant husband executed a sworn statement that both spouses were
bona fide residents of Florida. When subsequently the wife obtained a
Florida divorce, and the husband instituted a divorce action in Ala241. FLA. STAT. § 741.211 (1967). Common law marriage in social security, Gardner
v. Oldham, 381 F.2d 804 (5th Cir. 1967).
242. 187 So.2d 49 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
243. Id. at 51.
244. Id.
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bama,2 45 alleging his Alabama residence, the court took notice of his prior
sworn allegation that "he had been a resident of Florida less than a year
before he filed his bill for divorce in Alabama" and decided that it lacked
jurisdiction. s46
3.

FOREIGN DIVORCE DECREES

The res judicata effect of a Massachusetts divorce decree obtained
by the wife and urged in a Florida divorce action brought by the husband
was denied in Harless v. Harless24 ' on the ground that the defendant wife
had not carried the burden of proof by submitting only a copy of the
foreign decree.
The recognition of a New York divorce decree was at issue in Mirras
v. Mirras148 in view of Florida's ground eight.2 49 After marrying in New
York and residing there for two years, the wife returned to her mother in
Florida. One month later the husband filed in New York an action for
divorce on the ground of adultery and, with both parties participating,
obtained a divorce which also forbade the wife to "remarry any other
person during the lifetime of the plaintiff except with the permission of
the court.""25 In the meantime, the wife filed a divorce action of her own
in Florida which resulted, some ten months after the New York divorce,
in an unqualified divorce on the ground of extreme cruelty.
It appears that the divorcee may have instituted her action in Florida
for two reasons, (1) to obliterate the marital quarantine imposed on her
by the New York court, and (2) to obtain the custody of the child denied
her in New York. In Florida, her native state, the plaintiff was successful
on both points. Limiting the discussion here to the divorce aspect of the
case, it is essential to bear in mind that the appellate court admitted the
"jurisdiction of the New York court [in regard to divorce] and that its
decree is entitled to full faith and credit under the Federal Constitution."2 5' Since this finding prevented an outright denial of its effect in
Florida, the court selected the back door to be opened by ground eight
which provides that a divorce may be granted if the defendant "has
252
obtained a divorce from the complainant in any other state or country.1
The crucial issue whether or not the plaintiff divorcee is entitled to "obtain
a divorce in the State of Florida based upon the New York divorce in
245. Maner v. Maner, 279 Ala. 652, 189 So.2d 336 (1966).
246. Court declined jurisdiction to order husband to participate in Jewish ceremony
to obtain divorce, Turner v. Turner, 192 So.2d 787 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967).
247. 185 So.2d 728 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1966).
248. 202 So.2d 887 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967).
249. FLA. STAT. § 61.041(8) (1967).
250. Mirras v. Mirras, 202 So.2d 887, 889 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967). See N.Y. Dom. REL.
LAW § 8 (McKinney Supp. 1967) (repealed by N.Y. Laws 1966, ch. 254 § 1, effective Sept.
1, 1967), id. at § 15. Also 1 FosTE & FREED, LAW AND THE FAMILy: NEW YoRK 263 (1966).
251. Mirras v. Mirras, 202 So.2d 887, 890 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967).
252. FLA. STAT. § 61.041(8) (1967).
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favor of the other party '1 253 was first considered by the appellate court

in view of several factors pointing to a favorable decision, namely the possible modification of the prohibiting clause contained in the decree, its
alleged "incompleteness," and its limited finality under the law of New
York. However, none of these points was substantiated nor were reasons
given as to how and why they support the decision in favor of the divorced
wife. Instead, the court couched its opinion in the language of Keener v.
Keener,"5 the leading case on the meaning of ground eight. Italicizing the
passage from that case that the decree involved there was "not effective
as to both parties or is for other reasons invalid" the court held the New
York decree not to be binding on the plaintiff wife who, as a consequence,
is now "in position to invoke the provision of the statute in question to be
relieved from it," 255 i.e., from the New York divorce decree. While there

is no satisfactory explanation why the decree is not effective or for some
other reason invalid, the reliance on the additional cases is patently misplaced. The Pawley case 256 is an international rather than an interstate
case and, consequently not in point in a situation where the command of
full faith and credit is crucial; similarly, the Givens25 7 case deals not with
a sister state divorce but with a mere separation which, of course, does
not prevent a subsequent divorce.
It would appear from the language of the court that the marital
quarantine imposed upon the divorcee was considered as affecting the very
essence of the divorce granted, thus making the decree "incomplete" or, at
least, of doubtful "finality." However, the court admitted the validity of
the New York divorce decree regarding the plaintiff's marital status and
was disturbed only by the prohibition against remarriage. By taking this
position, the court already indicated that both parts of the divorce decree
were severable and, therefore, independent as to their validity and
effects.2 5 The court probably felt that the quarantine imposed upon the
253. Mirras v. Mirras, 202 So.2d 887, 890 (Fla. 1967).
254. 152 Fla. 13, 11 So.2d 180 (1942) ; see Survey I, at 331.
255. Mirras v. Mirras, 202 So.2d 887, 890 (Fla. 1967). Cf. Theatre Time Clock, v.
Stewart, 276 F. Supp. 593 (E.D. La. 1967).
256. Pawley v. Pawley, 46 So.2d 464 (Fla. 1950).
257. Givens v. Givens, 121 Fla. 270, 163 So. 574 (1935).
258. In regard to the prohibition to remarry, two better ways to find a reasonable
solution seem to exist. First, a Florida court of proper jurisdiction may lift the restriction
under the adage that what New York "could do in modifying the decree," Florida may do
since
[Whatever may be the authority of a State to undermine a judgment of a sister
state on grounds not cognizable in the State where the judgment was rendered ....
it is clear that the State of the forum has at least as much leeway to disregard the
judgment, to qualify it, or to depart from it as does the State where it was rendered.
Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610, 615 (1947). It is also probable that most jurisdictions,
among them New York [Fisher v. Fisher, 250 N.Y. 313, 165 N.E. 460 (1929); Beaudoin,
270 App. Div. 631, 62 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1946); Almodovar v. Almodovar, 284 N.Y.S.2d 910
(1967)], will deny any extraterritorial effect to the one-sided marital quarantine ordered
not by statute but by a court; this would apply in this case to Florida since the party to be
affected is a woman who became "unhappy and disillusioned" in another state and "departed
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guilty party tainted the marriage-dissolving function of the otherwise
valid divorce decree to such an extent as to make it unacceptable in spite
of the admitted qualification for full faith and credit. A hint indicating a
possible ground appears in the court's statement that a divorce coupled
with a unilateral prohibition against remarriage is "not permitted under
Florida law."2'59 Reading between the lines one may guess that the court
considered this difference to be of decisive significance. Following this
guess, it must be said that such differences are of no consequence since
every jurisdiction is free to determine any remedy, including those available in status actions. These remedies may range from none to divorce or
separation or both. No other state has any say in the matter, but must
give them full faith and credit. It is quite possible that the court saw in
the differences some question of public policy. But this ground is equally
ineffective since it is generally admitted that a mere difference between
the laws of jurisdictions involved in a full faith and credit relationship
will not, by itself, elevate the different rule in the second jurisdiction to
the level of public policy.26 ° Even if this should be the case, it is equally
well established that contrary public policy in the second jurisdiction will
not justify a denial of duties imposed upon sister states by the full faith
and credit clause.26'
Taking a final look at the opinion, it is apparent that the court was
not "writing upon a clean slate inasmuch as there have been many opposite, painstaking and articulate decisions placed upon the record by our
appellate courts.

2

62

However, it seems doubtful that the court while

"realizing that in retracing former tracks [it] also run[s] the risk of
smearing and obscuring," and finding it "helpful to apply to the facts in
the instant case the rules enunciated in the previous pronouncement" has
achieved its goal to "further mold and refine their scope and distinction."263
The validity of a Mexican divorce was at issue in Kittel v. Kittel 64
As in a recent Louisiana case, 6 the Florida court held that the rule of

from the marital domicile and returned to her native state and birthplace at Orlando,
Florida, to reside with her mother," Mirras v. Mirras, 202 So.2d 887, 889 (Fla. 2d Dist.
1967).
259. Mirras v. Mirras, 202 So.2d 887, 891 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967).
260. Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N.Y. 99, 120 N.E. 198 (1918).
261. Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230 (1908); Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532 (1935); Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430
(1943).
262. Mirras v. Mirras, 202 So.2d 887, 890 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967).
263. Id. A Florida ex parte divorce granted to wife did not prevent her claiming property
settlement and child support against the divorced husband in Minnesota, in spite of the
fact that the Florida court retained jurisdiction to enter further orders, and this on the
ground that the Florida court "intended only to keep its doors open to plaintiff, not to
foreclose her from seeking relief elsewhere." Gridzicki v. Quast, 149 N.W.2d 8 (Minn.
1967).
264. 194 So.2d 640 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967).
265. Clark v. Clark, La. -,
192 So.2d 594 (Ct. App. 1966). On Mexican divorces,
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comity toward foreign divorce decrees presupposes jurisdiction in the
foreign court. The recognition of such decrees is not a matter of obligation but rather one of deference and respect to the acts of a foreign jurisdiction. Here the court denied recognition on the ground that
To hold the alleged divorce decree to be valid as was obtained
in Mexico [by the husband] would permit any party desiring to
shed himself of a wife to simply go to a state or country several
thousands of miles away, remain there a few days, and secure a
divorce on grounds not even recognized in this State. Should this
be permitted, it would violate all principles of morality and justice. Certainly it is not an abuse of discretion, under the facts of
this case, to refuse to recognize the validity of the Mexican
decree.2 66
The following cases will illustrate how Florida divorce decrees have
fared in other jurisdictions. A divorce obtained by a wife who abandoned
her marital domicile in Alabama and established a separate domicile in
Florida was given full faith and credit in Alabama in spite of the fact that
Alabama and never submitted
the husband continued to be domiciled2 in
7
to the jurisdiction of the Florida court. 0
A Florida divorce decree was held not open to attack by a wife who
appeared in Florida through her attorney. 6 s A similar decree incorporating a property settlement was also held free from collateral attack. Similarly, a Florida divorce decree obtained after personal appearance of
both spouses was given full faith and credit in New York in the wife's
action for separation.2 69 However, a Florida divorce decree was open to
attack in New York for alleged lack of jurisdiction 27 0 while another decree
personal service on the
was held invalid because it was obtained without
2 71
defendant husband and without his appearance.
A Florida lump sum alimony decree was held not to relieve the husband from alimony awarded by a New York separation decree granted
prior to the Florida divorce. 2 During a suit for separate maintenance in
Louisiana, at issue was the effect of a prior Florida divorce decree which
was coupled with a lump sum alimony to the wife and granted after both
spouses had appeared.27 ' The Louisiana court held the Florida divorce
see generally BAYITCH & SIQUIEROS, CONFLICT OF LAWS: MEXICO AND THE UNITED STATES,
A BILATERAL STUDY (1968).

266. Kittel v. Kittel, 194 So.2d 640, 642 (Fla. 1967).
267. 195 So.2d 960 (Fla. 1967).
268. In re Locke's Will, 21 App. Div. 2d 248, 250 N.Y.S.2d 181 (1964).
269. Zeitlan v. Zeitlan, 27 App. Div. 2d 846, N.Y.S.2d 86 (1967).
270. Austin v. Austin, 25 App. Div. 2d 710, 268 N.Y.S.2d 586 (1966). Lack of bona fide
domicile was held fatal in Krieger v. Krieger, 285 N.Y.S.2d 811 (1967); lack of challenge of
domicile in Florida upheld a Florida divorce decree in Kram v. Kram, 98 N.J. Super. 274,
237 A.2d 271 (1967).
271. Russel v. Russel, 27 App. Div. 2d 563, 276 N.Y.S.2d 49 (1966).
272. Katz v. Katz, 26 App. Div. 2d 521, 270 N.Y.S.2d 786 (1966).
273. Bozarth v. Bozarth, La. -,
199 So.2d 544 (Ct. App. 1967).
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decree valid and the local separation proceedings abated. On the wife's
appeal from the portion of the Louisiana judgment denying her demand
for a partition of the marital property, the court held that according to
section 82 of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure "an action to partition community property shall be brought . . . as an incident of the
action which would result in a dissolution of the community," and concluded that since the dissolution of community between the parties "did
not arise from any judgment in the instant suit, hence the demand therein
for the 4 partition must fall as would all other issues in the separation
27
suit.
4.

ALIMONY

In an action by the divorced wife against her former husband for
past due child support awarded in a Georgia divorce decree, the Florida
court held that such claims are locally enforceable and subject to equitable
defenses (such as a subsequent modification by the parties). 27 Itdenied
an increase of support "during the pendency of the case, because at the
time it was presented the foreign decree had not been established in this
state," but allowed the wife to seek "modification [pursuant to the provisions of section 65.15 of the Florida Statutes] of the decree as ultimately rendered by the chancellor, provided the [wife] justifies the need
for change. 276
5.

MARITAL PROPERTY

An international conflict of laws problem was involved in an action
by the children of a prior marriage of the deceased father, against his
widow to determine their rights in his estate. 7 The couple, both Cuban
nationals, was married in Cuba and lived there until moving to Florida in
1960. In 1952 and 1958 the late husband acquired shares in a Florida corporation which he sold in 1963, receiving in exchange a promissory note
which is now the main asset in his estate. The appellate court reversed the
lower court judgment for the plaintiffs and held that interests of one
spouse in movables acquired by the other during the marriage are determined by the law of the domicile of the parties at that time, i.e., Cuba,
regardless of the fact that the monies used for the purchase may have
been earned outside the domicile. Consequently, under the controlling
Cuban Civil Code,2 71 the stock acquired by the husband must be con274. Id. at 199 So.2d 541. A collateral attack in Louisiana upon a Florida divorce
decree was held dependent on Florida's requirements for such attack on the authority of
La. -,
203 So.2d 379
Johnson v. Muelberger, 340 U.S. 581 (1951) in Gay v. Gay, (Ct. App. 1967).
275. Smith v. Smith, 197 So.2d 16 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967).
276. Id. at 17.
277. Quintana v. Ordono, 195 So.2d 577 (Fla.3d Dist. 1967).
278. CAvM CODE §§ 1401, 1407 (1899) (Cuba). Lay, Community Property in Common
Law States: A Comparative Analysis of its Treatment in Foreign Jurisdictions, 41 TEMPLE
L.Q. 1 (1967).
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sidered "as community property, until proven to be separate property" of
either spouse. Therefore, the stock did not vest in the husband but in the
sociedad de gananciales,in the community of acquisitions, under which the
wife acquired a vested interest in the stock equal to that of her husband,
an interest not affected by the subsequent change of domicile to Florida.
When the husband sold this stock and received the promissory note in
Florida (a transaction controlled by Florida law), a resulting trust arose
in favor of his wife to the extent of the consideration, (i.e., her interest in
the stock used in this transaction) even though the title was taken in the
husband's name alone. The court concluded that the estate holds legal
title to the note, and the administrators are trustees regarding his widow's
equitable interest therein.
6.

CUSTODY

The fate of two little girls sacrificed to the whims of unstable parents and to changing judicial attitudes is the background for the case of
Hoffman v. Linley.2 79 The record indicates that their parents were divorced in Texas in 1964 with custody being awarded to the mother. The
next year, on the father's petition, custody was shifted to his sister in
Florida. A few months later the father succeeded in having the Florida
decree modified and custody awarded to him. Early in 1966 the father
"remarried his present wife for the third time," after she had, in the
meantime, married another man "by whom she had one child." The remarriage, however, did not prevent the mother from marrying again in
1966 in Texas a man other than the father of the two little girls. In
the instant proceedings in Florida where she sought the return of custody
of the little girls, the court granted the petition on the ground of changed
circumstances, finding the mother to be a "proper and fit person to have
the permanent .

.

. custody ...

of said children. 2

°

On appeal the deci-

sion was affirmed on the ground that the father was awarded custody only
under "a post decree modification order," which relieved the mother from
the burden of "showing unfitness of the husband or that his stewardship
is improper, as would have been required of her had the husband been
awarded the custody of the children in the final decree of divorce." 8
The court added that
[A]n award of custody in a final decree of divorce is to be regarded as res judicataas of the time of the decree, and that after
the right to custody has thus been fixed by the divorce decree in
one parent, on consideration of a subsequent petition for a
change of the custody of the children [the court] does not have
the same degree of discretion to choose between the parties regarding the matter of custody, as it had on the occasion of the
279. 201 So.2d 638 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967).
280. Id. at 639.
281. Id. at 640.
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final custody
decree determination made in the final decree of di282
vorce.

In Lindsey v. Lindsey,2" a California custody decree was given effect
by comity, "even though the decree was not formally introduced into
evidence," but had been made a part of the record of which the court
took judicial notice.
In Mirras v. Mirras,28 4 discussed earlier,211 the litigation turned also

around the New York divorce decree granting custody of the child to
the plaintiff father. In the Florida relitigation of the divorce, the appellate court granted custody to the divorced plaintiff mother. Following
the assumption that custody decrees "being universally subject to modification ' ' 2" are not final, the court declined to give the New York custody decision any weight because, in the opinion of the court, New York
lacked jurisdiction, having proceeded "without the presence of the child
within the jurisdiction,)

28 7

28 8

and because the issue was "not truly liti-

gated.
In regard to the first ground it suffices to note that the lack of
jurisdiction was found on the basis of Florida law in the matter, and not
the lex fori, i.e., New York. In any case, the argument lacks persuasiveness particularly since both parents were subject to the jurisdiction of
the New York court. Furthermore, there is no express finding that
Florida has a more substantial interest in the custody of the child, or
that circumstances changed so as to induce the court to take steps furthering the child's interests.
An attempt by a mother who had been awarded custody of the child
by a Massachusetts divorce decree, to prevent a Florida juvenile court
from ruling on the father's petition for a change of custody was unsuc289
cessful in State v. Yergey.

7.

ADOPTION

Florida law regarding equitable adoptions was applied in a District
of Columbia litigation involving the distribution of the estate of a decedent who was an illegitimate child born in Florida and who died intestate
in the District of Columbia.2" ° To decide the question of claims by the
282. Id.
283. 200 So.2d 643 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1967). A final Florida divorce decree granting
custody to mother will be enforced in North Carolina unless change of conditions "since
the entry of the Florida decree" is shown, In re Marlowe, 268 N.C. 197, 150 S.E.2d 204
(1966).
284. 202 So.2d 887 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967).
285. See p. 554 supra.
286. Mirras v. Mirras, 202 So.2d 887, 892 (Fla. 1967).
287. Id.
288. Id. at 893.
289. 188 So.2d 833 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1966).
290. In re Estate of McConnell, 268 F. Supp. 346 (D.D.C. 1967).
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decedent's relatives by informal (equitable) adoption, the court held
that "Florida being the situs of the alleged adoption in this case, the law
of the state on equitable adoptions has signicance." After considering the
leading Florida case of Sheffield v. Barry,2 9' the court found that the fact
that Florida does recognize equitable adoption was not decisive of this
case. Instead, the issue in this instance was whether the natural children
of the foster parent could inherit from the adoptee. The court felt that
the law is "not kindly disposed toward claims to the estate of a deceased
adoptee where they are made by the heirs of an adoptive parent who did
not take legal steps to formalize the adoption ' 292 and sustained the objection of the District of Columbia claiming escheat.
F. Taxation
The constitutionality of the Virgin Island gross receipt tax imposed
on a Florida corporation was again293 contested to no avail in Port Construction Company v. Government of Virgin Islands.29 4 The company's
argument that the statute applies to receipts from business done both
within and without the territory, was countered by the court by way of
a simple reminder that the plaintiff corporation was assessed only on receipts derived from local business. Consequently, it was not "injured by
what it asserts is the unconstitutional breadth of the statute." The attack
based on the equal protection clause of the Constitution was equally in
vain, since the court found that the legislature of the Virgin Islands has
the "widest latitude selecting the subjects of taxation and in granting
exemptions" to domestic corporations. The standard, in the words of the
court, does not prohibit "those inequities which may result from singling
out one particular class for taxation or exemption therefrom." "Only if
it appears," the court continued, "that there is no rational basis for the
classification so that it is patently arbitrary, may it be set aside as unconstitutional."2 5 This was not the case here, since it was
clearly not irrational or arbitrary for the Legislature in enacting
its industrial incentive program to limit corporate tax exemptions and subsidies to those corporations which are organized
under the laws of the Territory and which, by reason of their
local organization and the control of the Territory over them,
could be expected to remain as296permanent participants in the
economic life of the community.
291. 153 Fla. 144, 14 So.2d 417 (1943).

292. In re Estate of McConnell, 268 F. Supp. 346, 349 (D.D.C. 1967).
293. See Survey II, at 545.
294. 359 F.2d 663 (3d Cir. 1966).

295. Id. at 668.
296. Id. A Florida trust agreement was involved in United States v. Van der Horst,
270 F. Supp. 365 (D. Del. 1967) discussing the Tax Convention with the Netherlands, April
29, 1948, 62 Stat. 1757, T.I.A.S. No. 1855.
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G. Criminal Law
In no other area of the conflict of laws is the principle of territoriality
as strictly followed as in criminal law. Even there, however, forces arising from various quarters have eroded the once axiomatic territorial
monopoly. The presently prevailing principles are well stated in the recent case of Rivard v. United States" 7 as follows:
[T] he law of nations permits the exercise of criminal jurisdiction by a nation under five general principles. They are the territorial, national, protective, universality and passive personality
principles .... There are, however, two views as to the scope of
the territorial principle. Under the subjective view, jurisdiction
extends over all persons in the state and there violating its laws.
Under the objective view, jurisdiction extends over all acts
which take effect within the sovereign even though the author
is elsewhere.29
Keeping in mind that, at least in criminal cases, jurisdiction is identical
with the application of the criminal lex fori, the court concluded that
((mere presence of the ... alien defendants before the court did not give
[the court] jurisdiction. The question remains whether their conduct
within the United States had such a deleterious effect within the United
States to justify this country in prohibiting"299 and punishing such conduct under its own laws.
The following Florida cases may appear in better perspective in the
light of this background. They deal with criminal acts committed in the
twilight zone beyond the territorial waters of Florida where the usefulness of the strict territorial principle ceases and other justification must
be found for the application of the law of the coastal state, such as the
citizenship of the defendant or the protective principle. In cases where
the criminal statute was expressly made applicable to the "salt waters of
Monroe County, Florida," the court granted the motion to dismiss relying
on the provision of section 6.11 of the Florida Statutes establishing the
boundary of Florida into the Atlantic Ocean as "a line three geographical
miles distant from the said coast line," and on the undisputed fact that
the traps had been set beyond this boundary."' 0 The same position was
taken by the Supreme Court of Florida in Mounier v. State,3 01 involving
spearfishing in a prohibited area beyond the Monroe County boundary
line.302 Since it was not questioned that the "offense was committed beyond this line (i.e., Florida's boundary line in the Atlantic), it follows
that the conviction was a nullity and that these defendants should have
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.

375 F.2d 882 (5th Cir. 1967).
Id. at 885.
Id.
United States v. Hill, 266 F. Supp. 670 (S.D. Fla. 1965),
178 So.2d 714 (Fla. 1965).
FLA. STAT. § 379.172(2) (1963),
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been discharged." ' 3 The dissenting opinion by Justice Ervin foreshadowed future trends favoring a functional approach to the understanding of state boundaries. 0 4
The majority of the Mounier court prevailed again in Burns v.
Rozen.3 °5 In spite of the statutory provision contained in section 3 70.02 (5)
of the Florida Statutes that the Board of Conservation has the power to
regulate fishing activities "within or without the boundaries of such state
waters," the court maintained the restrictive attitude on the ground that
the statutory provision cited
merely recognizes what has been said previously, that the state
has the power to regulate activities of its citizens and vessels outside of its territorial limits. However, this power does not come
into play automatically in each statute dealing with conservation of natural resources. There is no presumption that the
legislature intended that a statute exercise or apply all the
power which a state may possess over a given subject. Extraterritorial effect of an enactment is not to be found by implication.3 06
However, the weight of the arguments in the dissenting opinion in Mounier was felt in Felton v. Hodges.3 0 7 There the federal court of appeals
affirmed the dismissal of an action against Florida conservation officials
for arrests when enforcing the Florida statutory protection of crawfish
beyond state territorial waters. The court distinguished the holding in
Mounier on the ground that it dealt with spearfishing in a specified area
of Monroe County, and the State had failed to prove that the alleged offense occurred within that specified area. It also took comfort from the
Mounier dissent by pointing to section 370.02 (5) of the Florida Statutes
charging the Conservation Board with the duty to regulate fishermen
and vessels "of this state engaged in the taking of such fishery resources
within and without the boundaries of such state waters." In the words
of the court,
Florida has sought by legislative enactment to extend the jurisdiction of its conservation officials to activities such as those
which appellant claims to have been engaged in here. If the
State can properly do so under the federal constitution, the dis308
missal of this complaint must be affirmed.

This was achieved on the authority of Skiriotes v. State of Florida.30°
The court first inquired whether Florida had a legitimate interest in con303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.

Mounier v. State, 178 So.2d 714, 717 (Fla. 1965).

Id.
201 So.2d 629 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1967).
Id. at 631.
374 F.2d 337 (5th Cir. 1967).
Id. at 338.
313 U.S. 69 (1941).
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trolling the activities involved since they took place in a "group of reefs
adjacent to the Florida Keys [where] the crawfish in this area move
freely in and out of Florida's territorial waters, so that any taking of
them would clearly have an effect upon the State's conservation efforts," 31
even though this may amount to an "extraterritorial regulation," provided the state's interest in conservation is thereby protected. In this
respect, the court held that it was "apparent that the State has an interest
sufficient to enable it to subject appellant, one of its own citizens, to the
conservation regulations which it sought to enforce here." 31 1 In conclu-

sion the court reached the question of whether arrests made outside of
Florida's territorial waters are acts under the color of a state statute,
depriving citizens of the United States of basic constitutional rights. The
court admitted that "no state is at liberty to abridge the rights of persons
not subject to its jurisdiction by indiscriminate arrests, effected beyond
its territorial limits, under the guise of attempted exercise of the extraterritorial regulatory powers which it enjoys under the rule of Skiriotes.' '312
Nevertheless, the court held that the arrests were
an integral part of the efforts of the State of Florida to regulate
the conduct of one of its own citizens in a matter in which the
State clearly had a legitimate interest. In our opinion, the added
fact that one or more of these arrests may have taken place a
few miles outside Florida's seaward boundary line cannot transmute the otherwise proper efforts of these State officials into
a violation of appellant's constitutional rights." 3
It may be added that the Florida Territorial Waters Act of 1963
competes with the federal enactment of 1964 in regard to licensing and to
criminal sanctions.31 4 It is also noteworthy that in 1966 by act of Congress a contiguous zone was established beyond states' territorial waters
thus claiming for the United States in regard to fisheries the "same exclusive rights . . . in the zone as it has in its territorial sea, subject to

the continuation of traditional fishing by foreign states within this zone
as may be recognized by the United States" ' with the proviso that
310. Felton v. Hodges, 374 F.2d 337, 339 (1967).

311. Id.
312. Id.
313. Id. at 340. In October, 1967, a federal judge in Miami directed in a trial against
five Cubans indicted for piracy on the high seas committed two miles off Miami Beach,
a verdict of acquittal relying on the Convention on the High Seas, [1958] 13 U.S.T. 2312,
T.I.A.S. No. 5200, defining in art. 1 high seas as "all parts of the sea that are not included
in the territorial sea or in the internal waters of a State." Miami Herald, Oct. 24, 1967, at 1.
314. Prohibition of Foreign Fishing Vessels in the Territorial Waters of the United
States, 16 U.S.C. 1081-1085 (1964).
315. Fisheries Zone Contiguous to Territorial Sea of the United States, 16 U.S.C.A.
§ 1091-1094 (Supp. 1967). The language appears to be inconsistent with the section-bysection analysis supplied in the House Report No. 2086 that the United States would
"exercise the same exclusive rights as its coastal States now exercise in respect to fisheries in
the zone of its territorial waters" (emphasis added).
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Nothing in this Act shall be construed as extending the jurisdiction of the States to the natural resources beneath and in the
waters within the fisheries zone established by this Act or as
diminishing their jurisdiction to such resources beneath and in
the waters of the territorial seas of the United States. 8 '
VI.

AVIATION

The most significant developments occurred in the area of international air transportation insofar as it is regulated by the Warsaw Convention. 1 7 Strong pressures brought to bear on the federal authorities
(including the Department of State) by a small but persuasive group of
attorneys specializing in aviation negligence cases, have succeeded in
securing an unusual modification of the Convention through adhesion
agreements drafted by federal authorities and presented to domestic and
foreign carriers for acceptance. Air passengers within the scope of the
Warsaw Convention whose trips touch the territory of the United States
-regardless of their nationality-became entitled to invoke absolute
liability against the air carriers up to the amount of 75,000 dollars. However it is surprising to find that both intrastate and interstate passengers
on domestic flights must still prove negligence on the part of the carrier
and in quite a few jurisdictions see their claims cut down to the statutory
maximum of some 20,000 dollars.
Relying on article 22, paragraph (1) of the Warsaw Convention, the
United States Government, through the Civil Aeronautics Board, has
approved an agreement 1 s to be adopted by domestic and foreign air car316. Id. at § 1094.
317. Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air, 49 Stat. 3000 (1939). See generally on treaty law of aviation, Bayitch,
El Actual Derecho Convencional de la Aviaci6n, 18 BOLETIN DEL INSTITUTO DE DERECHO
COMPARADO DE Mixico 723 (1965).
An action arising out of a crash in Jacksonville, Florida, in 1955, involving the Warsaw
Convention, Berguido v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 317 F.2d 628 (3d Cir. 1963), rehearing
denied, 317 F.2d 633 (1963); cert. denied, 375 U.S. 895 (1963), 35 F.R.D. 200 (E.D. Pa.
1964), aff'd, 369 F.2d 874 (3d Cir. 1966), 378 F.2d 369 (3d Cir. 1967) has been decided, the
Supreme Court denying certiorari,-U.S.-(1968), 88 S.Ct. 194.
318. 31 F. Reg. 7302 (1966). Fitz-Gerald, Liability Rules in the International Carriage
of Passengers by Air and the Notice oj Denunciation of the Warsaw Convention by the
United States, 4 CAN YS. INT'r. L. 210 (1966) ; Lacey, Recent Developments in the Warsaw
Convention, 33 J. AiR L. & Comm. 385 (1967); Lowenfield & Mendelson, The United States
and the Warsaw Convention, 80 HARv. L. REv, 497 (1967); Riggs, Termination of Treaties
by the Executive without Congressional Approval: the Case of the Warsaw Convention, 32
J. AiR L. & Comm. 526 (1966); Sinkoff, Absolute Liability and Increased Damages in
InternationalAviation Accidents, 52 A.B.A.J. 1122 (1966) ; Stephen, The Adequate Award in
InternationalAviation Accidents, 1966 INs. L.J. 711; Weiner, The 1966 Carrier Agreement:
the United States Retains the Warsaw Convention, 7 VA. J. INT'L L. 140 (1966). See also
Bayitch & LeRiverend, La Convenci6n de Varsovia en la Actualidad, 17 REVISTA DE LA
FACULTAD DE DERECHO DE Mkxico 845 (1967), also in FoLcui (ed.), CUESTIONEs ACTUALES
DE DERECHO AERONAUTICO 98 (Buenos Aires, 1968) ; and Mankiewicz, Le Statut de l'Arrange-

ment de Montreal (Mai 1966) et la Dicision du Civil Aeronautics Board du 13 Mai 1966 ...
21 REvuE FRANqAISE DE DRorr AARIEN 384 (1967).

no. 4 (1967).

See symposium in 33 J. Am L. & Commn.

,
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riers operating in and out of the United States, after the United States
has withdrawn its initial denunciation of the Warsaw Convention. The
agreement is expressly designed to operate within the general framework
of the Convention with some modifications. The definition of an international flight still stands as determining the coverage by the Convention;"' 9 however, the agreement has added as a further limitation that in
order to be affected by the agreement, a flight which is international
according to article I, paragraph 2 of the Convention, must also be a
flight "which includes a point in the United States as a point of origin,
point of destination, or agreed upon stopping place." In regard to flights
meeting these requirements, the agreement provides a new, higher limit
of liability imposed upon cooperating air carriers for "death, wounding
or other bodily injury" of passengers within the scope of article 17 of the
Convention. The agreement has replaced the original limitation of 8,300
dollars under article 22 (which remains in force for all international
flights which only meet requirements of article 1, paragraph 2 of the
Convention, but not the additional set up by the agreement) with a raised
limit of 75,000 dollars, exclusive of legal fees, and up to 58,000 dollars for
jurisdictions "where provision is made for separate award of legal fees
and costs." Nevertheless, passengers on flights covered by the agreement
retain the right to claim full damages in cases of willful misconduct or if
they have not been provided with a ticket while carriers retain the defense
of contributory negligence in accordance with the lex fori as provided by
the Convention. Under the agreement, however, carriers are deprived of
their defense under article 20, paragraph 1 of the Convention providing,
The carrier shall not be liable if he proves that he and his agents
have taken all necessary measures to avoid the damages or that
it was impossible for him or them to take such measures.
This defense remains if the flight is governed by the Warsaw Convention
alone. Finally, the agreement allows carriers to stipulate that their rights
and liabilities will remain unaffected "with regard to any claim brought
by, on behalf of, or in respect to any person who has wilfully caused
damage which results in death, wounding, or other bodily injury of a
3 20
passenger," a provision intended to discourage sabotage.
319. Difficulties arising in cases where cooperating air carrier are registered and operate
from and to countries not members of the Warsaw Convention, may be solved by applying

the Convention as lex voluntatis.See Bayitch & LeRiverend, supra note 318.
320. It is interesting to note that during the ICAO Conference in Montreal (1966) the
United States delegate made the following surprising statement: "It is the judgment of his
delegation that any limits of liability applicable at the place of accident would likewise be
disregarded. In awarding damages, the applicable law in the courts of the United States
would either be the one where the air journey began or the one at the domicile of the victim
or his survivors. In general, this means for United States citizens, American law would
govern the awarding of damages," Special ICAO Meeting on the Limits for Passengers
under the Warsaw Convention and.the Hague Protocol 81 (Montreal, 1966). Ci. Tramontana
v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense, 350 F.2d 468 (D.C. Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 383 U.S. 943 (1966), and recently Armiger v. Real S.A. Transportes Aereos, 377 F.2d
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The changing fortunes to which the Kilberg doctrine was exposed in
Florida have already been described.3 21 The following are some of the
noteworthy reported cases involving aviation. In Sims v. Northwest Airlines, Inc.322 an action was brought by an airline employee and his wife
for damages to the wife and children riding on passes, for injuries resulting from the defendant air carrier's negligence. The court held that the
matter of free passes in interstate transportation is governed by federal
law allowing waiver of liability, notwithstanding anything in state law to
the contrary. The fact that the plaintiff had paid a "service charge" and
had not signed the trip pass containing the waiver was held irrelevant. In
another case3 23 a Florida corporation claimed that money was owed it by
the corporate Panamanian owner of an aircraft which the plaintiff had repaired. The substantive issue of agency was held to be controlled by
Florida law, thus bypassing a possible conflict aspect.
A jurisdictional question was raised in Horton v. J.& J. Aircraft,
Inc.124 A libel in admiralty for personal injuries not resulting in death was
filed by a plaintiff injured in a plane crash in the Atlantic on a flight from
Florida to Georgetown, British West Indies. The case was held to be
within federal admiralty jurisdiction on the ground that "admiralty jurisdiction depends entirely on locality," even where a "tort occurred in an
airplane over the ocean and there was no contact with the water, 3 2 5 and
even though the claim did not arise from a maritime wrong.
VII.

ADMIRALTY

The four Geneva conventions signed in 1958 unified large areas of
the international law of the seas, mainly the territorial waters,320 continental shelf,3 2 7 and high seas,3

2

8

including fishery conservation.3 29 Among

these Conventions the one on territorial waters is of immediate interest to
Florida since it includes provisions regulating the exercise of civil and
criminal jurisdiction within this area of the sea.
943 (D.C. Cir. 1967); also Ciprari v. Servicios Aereos Cruzeiro, 245 F. Supp. 819 (S.D.N.Y.
1965), aff'd, 359 F.2d 855 (2d Cir. 1966).
321. See V(A), supra.
322. 269 F. Supp. 272 (S.D. Fla. 1967).
323. Aerovias Panama v. Air Carrier Engine Serv., Inc., 195 So.2d 230 (Fla. 3d Dist.
1967).
324. 257 F. Supp. 120 (S.D. Fla. 1966).
325. Id. at 121. A suit for damages to passenger caused by air turbulance over Florida
on an interstate flight was decided without conflict aspects, Strauss v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.,
266 F.2d 559 (E.D. Pa. 1967). Damages to a competing airline from a nonlicensed airline
were litigated in Caribbean Atlantic Airlines v. Leeward Islands Air Trans., 269 F. Supp.
231 (D.P.R. 1967).
326. Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, April 29, 1958, 15
U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639.
327. Convention on the Continental Shelf, April 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S.
No. 5578.
328. Convention on the High Seas (Geneva, 1958), 13 U.S.T. 2312.
329. 52 Am. J. INT'L L. 851 (1958).
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The exercise of civil jurisdiction over foreign vessels and persons
thereon passing through territorial waters is regulated in article 20 of the
Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, ratified by
the United States and presently in force. 330 In regard to persons on board
such vessels, the Convention prohibits the coastal country from stopping
or diverting a foreign ship for the purpose of "exercising civil jurisdiction
in relation to a person on board ship." ' ' A different rule applies in regard
to civil proceedings against a vessel passing through the territorial waters.
The Convention denies the coastal country the right to "levy execution
against or arrest the ship for the purposes of any civil action," except for
claims "assumed or incurred by the ship itself in the course or for the
purpose of its voyage through the waters of the coastal State."33' 2 However, these provisions do not affect the "right of the coastal State, in
accordance with its laws, to levy execution against or arrest, for the purpose of civil proceedings, a foreign ship lying in the territorial sea or
passing through the territorial sea after leaving internal waters." 3 It
follows that these restrictions upon the sovereignty of coastal states over
territorial waters do not apply to foreign vessels when in internal waters
as defined in article 5 of the Convention. 34
In regard to criminal jurisdiction, the same Convention grants coastal
countries different jurisdictional powers depending on the place where the
crime was committed. In case the crime was committed on board ship
when within the territorial waters of such country, its powers further depend on the fact that the foreign vessel did or did not enter that country's
internal waters. In regard to foreign vessels passing through territorial
waters after leaving the internal waters, the Convention imposes no limitations on the coastal country's criminal jurisdiction, provided the exercise
of such acts is "authorized by its laws," and aims at an "arrest or investigation." a However, if the foreign vessel is only passing through
the territorial seas, without entering territorial waters, the coastal country
may exercise criminal jurisdiction "on board a foreign ship . . . to arrest

any person or to conduct any investigation in connection with any crime
committed on board the ship during its passage," only in cases listed in
the Convention, namely: (a) if the "consequences of the crime extend to
the coastal State"; or (b) if the crime is of a "kind to disturb the peace of
the country or the good order of the territorial sea"; or (c) if the "assistance of the local authorities has been requested by the captain of the ship
or by the consul of the country whose flag the ship flies"; or (d) if it is
330. See note 285 supra.
331. Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, April 29, 1958, art. 20,
para. 1, 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639.
332. Id. art. 20, para. 2.
333. Id. art. 20, para. 3.
334. "Waters on the landward side of the baseline of the territorial sea form part of the
internal waters of the State." Id. art. 5, para. 1.
335. Id. art. 19, para. 2.

1968]

CONFLICT OF LAWS

"necessary for the suppression of illicit traffic in narcotic drugs."" 6 In regard to crimes committed on board ship before the ship entered the territorial waters, even though it is presently passing through them, the
coastal country has no criminal jurisdiction, unless the vessel has entered
337
its internal waters.
The 1965 Yarmouth Castle disaster on the high seas off the coast of
Florida swamped the federal district court in Miami with some 440 claims
for damages against the shipowner, a Panamanian corporation. The first
question to be decided was the possibility of limiting the shipowner's
liability. In Petition of Chadade Steamship CoY. 8 the court decided to
apply Panamanian law as codified in article 1078 of the Panamanian
Commercial Code, since the law of the flag governs "not only criminal
conduct but also the substantive rights of the crew, passengers and the
shipowner in civil causes of action arising thereon,"33 " provided there is
no overriding public policy of the forum which would make the law of the
flag unacceptable. Faced with substantial differences in the limitation
provisions of the Panamanian law as contrasted with the federal Limitation of Liability Act of 1851, the shipowner urged that limitation provisions are procedural and that the law of the forum should control. On both
points the court ruled in favor of applying Panamanian law, pointing out
that limitation provisions are substantive, that there is no public policy
of the forum contrary to the Panamanian Code provision and that the
Limitation of Liability Act was designed primarily to apply to American
flag vessels. The court added that:
American courts should and would apply the monetary limit of
the American statute only when referred thereto by choice-oflaw rules. Conflict of law doctrines are based essentially on the
concept of justice corresponding to the moral and social values
which are held by the society. People frame their expectations
with reference to the legal system with which their legal relationships have the most significant contacts at the time of the
event in question and expect that the law of that jurisdiction will
govern these relationships. If the parties' justified expectations
are dependent upon foreign law for substantive rights, that law
should be applied. 4
The Yarmouth Castle disaster triggered a flurry of activities aimed
336. Id. art. 19, para. 1.
337. Id. art. 19, para. 5.
338. 226 F. Supp. 517 (S.D. Fla. 1967). Cf. Bancroft Nay. Co. v. Chadade Steamship
Co., 349 F.2d 527 (2d Cir. 1965).
339. Id. at 519.
340. Id. at 523. The law of the flag also determines the law regarding general average
after stranding off the coast of the Dominican Republic, Cia. Atlantica Pacifica, S.A. v.
Humble Oil & Refining Co., 274 F. Supp. 884 (D. Md. 1967). Definition of an "ocean tramp"
operating between Miami and the Dominican Republic in United States v. Stephen
Brothers Line, 384 F.2d 118 (5th Cir. 1967).
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at strengthening international safety standards. 41 These efforts have resulted within the United States in a number of federal and state enactments. The federal act

42

imposed on domestic and foreign shipowners,

operators and travel agents the duty to disclose in their advertisements
the safety standards of the respective vessels whenever sea passage takes
place on vessels over one hundred gross tons or having births for fifty or
more passengers "embarking at United States ports for a coastwise or an
international voyage.1 43 Furthermore, owners or charterers of domestic
and foreign vessels with accommodations for fifty or more passengers, and
embarking passengers at United States ports, must establish their "financial responsibility to meet any liability [they] may incur for death or
injury to passengers or other persons on voyages to or from the United
States," in amounts ranging from 5,000 dollars to 20,000 dollars, depending on the number of passenger accommodations. 4 4 Such amounts "shall
be available to pay any judgment for damages, whether in amount less
than or more than $20,000.00 for death or injury occurring on such voyages to any passenger or other person.", 45 Since these provisions aim only
at establishing and securing financial responsibility on the part of ship
owners or charterers in accord with statutory standards, they are not to
be construed as limitations upon such responsibility.
Following in the footsteps of national legislation, Florida, in 1967,
enacted similar provisions dealing with the sale of passage tickets to a
"passage or conveyance upon any vessel, or a berth or stateroom in any
vessel" domestic or foreign. 40 Owners or agents involved are subject to
criminal responsibility for false or misleading information regarding vessels. Moreover, tickets as well as advertisements for passage or conveyance "aboard any foreign vessel" must disclose "the country of registry of
such vessel." Any ticket or similar instrument for a "passage upon the
high seas, from any port of this state, to any port of any other state or
nation," or any receipt of money therefor must state not only the name of
the vessel, of the owner, of the company, or of the line, but also the vessel's country of registry, the place of departure and destination, the date
of departure, the name of the passenger
and the amount of money paid.
3 47
Violations are "punishable by law.

1

341. Miller, New International Rules for Passenger-Ship Safety, 56 DEP'T STATE BULL.
173 (1967); Mortimer, Recent Responses to the Problem of Passenger Vessel Safety, 8
HARV. INTL L.J. 339 (1967); Clingan, Legislative Flotsam and International Action in the
Yarmouth Castle's Case, 35 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 675 (1967); and 61 Am. J. INT'L L. 800
(1967).
342. 46 U.S.C. § 362, as amended, 80 Stat. 1356 (1966).
343. Id. 80 Stat. 1356(b).
344. Id. 80 Stat. 1356(2) (a).
345. Id.
346. FLA. STAT. § 358.06 (1967).
347. Similar statutes have been enacted in California, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts,
New Jersey and Pennsylvania. The New Jersey statute was held unconstitutional in Cunard
Steamship Co. v. Lucci, 92 N.J. Super. 148, 222 A.2d 522 (1966), aff'd, 94 N.J. Super. 440,
228 A.2d 719 (1967).
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Maritime liens on a Panamanian vessel were litigated in Freedom
Line Incorporated v. Vessel Glenrock. 48 The perennial question of seaworthiness"' was litigated in Symonette Shipyards, Ltd. v. Clark.3 50 The
case involved a choice between the law of the Bahamas as the place of the
injury and country of the flag, or law of the United States based on the
nationality of the injured seaman and on the the fact that the ship's
articles were signed in the United States as was the contract between the
businessman and the shipowner. Admitting that the "seven factors listed
in Lauritzen3"' as influencing the choice of law . . . lend some support
to [the defendant's] argument" in favor of Bahamian law, nevertheless,
the court felt the "most significant choice of law factor to be the nationality of the injured and deceased seaman ' 352 and applied the law of the
United States. This choice was further supported by the court's emphasis
on the fact that the law of the United States is "well established and easily
determined, whereas the evidence of the Bahamian law is vague and indefinite," adding that "even if Bahamian law were held to govern this
case, the district judge correctly applied American maritime law in light
of his finding, amply supported by the record, that [the defendant] had
failed to prove the pertinent principles of Bahamian law,"3 "3 particularly
regarding the proof of negligence and available defenses. 54
A petition for a license to wreck off the coast of Florida was denied
in In re Andrews 55 after a careful interpretation of the controlling
statute. 56
348. 268 F. Supp. 7 (S.D. Fla. 1967).
349. Foley, A Survey of the Maritime Doctrine of Seaworthiness, 46 ORE. L. REV. 369
(1967); Note, The Warranty of Seaworthiness: An Appraisal of Longshoremen's Remedies
for On-the-Job Injuries, 42 N.Y.U.L. REv. 331 (1967).
350. 330 F.2d 554 (5th Cir. 1964), aff'd, 365 F.2d 464 (5th Cir. 1966). Cf. Gibbs v.
Kiesel, 382 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1967).
351. Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1953). Listed as the place of the wrongful act,
law of the flag, allegiance of the injured, allegiance of the shipowner, place of the contract, inaccessibility of the foreign forum, and the law of the forum (at 467), overlooking
the law chosen by parties.
352. Symonette Shipyards, Ltd. v. Clark, 365 F.2d 464, 468 (1966), cert. denied, 378
U.S. 908 (1967). See generally Bue, Admiralty Law in the Fifth Circuit: a Compendium for
Practitioners,4 HOUSToN L. REV. 347 (1966).
353. Id.
354. It is refreshing to read in another seaworthiness case the court's description of the
jury charge as their "once-in-a-lifetime-law-school-for-a-day." United States Lines Co. v.
Williams, 365 F.2d 332, 335 (5th Cir. 1966).
The law of admiralty and not the Florida Wrongful Death Statute applies in an action
for damages resulting from an airboat collision on the Kissimmee River, Weed v. Bilbrey,
201 So.2d 771 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967). Removal of action arising from injuries on board a
yacht in Nassau, Preston v. Grant Advertising, Inc., 275 F.2d 439 (5th Cir. 1967). Action
for damages suffered on a Caribbean cruise, Alpert v. Zim Lines, 370 F.2d 115 (2d Cir.
1966).
355. 266 F. Supp. 162 (M.D. Fla. 1967).
356. 46 U.S.C.A. § 724 (1967 Supp.).

